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THE EMPTINESS OF MAJORITY RULE
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer*
INTRODUCTION
In a democratic society, the people are the rulers of their own
collective destinies.' Under our republican form of government,
however, ruling mainly entails turning out to the local public
schools and civic centers every few years to cast our electoral
preferences.2 Accordingly, "[e]lections are at the core of the
American political system. They are the way we choose government
leaders, a source of the government's legitimacy, and a means by
which citizens try to influence public policy."3
Unlike its Athenian democratic ancestor, which expected its
demos, or citizens, to take full part in the affairs of the polis, or
* Executive Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Race & Law, Volume 1, 1996. B.A.
1990, University of Michigan; MA. 1993, Eastern Michigan University; J.D. expected 1997,
University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D. precandidate, Political Science, University of
Michigan.
1. According to President Lincoln, democracy entails a government "of the people,
by the people, for the people." Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863),
in LINCOLN ON DEMOCRACY 308 (Mario M. Cuomo & Harold Holzer eds., 1990). This
definition, Winston Churchill declared, "still remains the sovereign definition of
democracy." Winston S. Churchill, parliament bill presented at House of Commons
(Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963, at
7565 (Robert R. James ed., 1974).
2. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. Such a narrow definition of
participation, while seemingly accepted in modem political society, is not entirely
accurate. See, e.g., SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA:
POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 47 (1972) (positing that "there are four
broad modes of political participation that are used, in ordinary circumstances, by
citizens: voting, campaign activity, citizen-initiated contacts, and cooperative
participation"). In a more specific sense, these activities might include:
following accounts of public affairs in the media, engaging in political discussions,
voting, proselytizing, taking part in campaigns, donating money to political causes
and candidates, contacting public officials on either personal or community
matters, joining with fellow citizens to deal with political problems, taking part in
protest demonstrations, and seeking public office.
Stephen E. Bennett & Linda L. M. Bennett, Political Participation, in 1 ANNUAL REVIEW
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 157, 162 (Samuel Long ed., 1986).
3. RAYMONDE. WOLFINGER& STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 1 (1980).
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political society, American political society thrives on the notion of
limited, indirect citizen participation. According to James Madison,
citizens elect representatives who will in turn serve as the "proper
guardians of the public weal."' More importantly, he proceeded:
[a republic] refine[s] and enlarge[s] the public views by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial consider-
ations.5
In short, citizens depend on their representatives on matters of
governance.
In light of such original understandings, this country's anemic
election turnouts should not be surprising. Representative gov-
ernment ensures that the people do not govern directly, thus
decreasing their level of political involvement while furthering their
indifference to the realities of political life and matters of gov-
ernance. Furthermore, this country's traditional political practices
impede, rather than further, any idealistic notion of full partici-
pation.7 For a system that proclaims democracy to be its underlying
principle of governance, American society has a rather curious way
of demonstrating its democratic affection.
Yet, this is only part of the story. Full citizen participation, after
all, might not be crucial to self-governance. We would not be both-
ered, for example, if a variety of factions took part in politics, as they
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T
VOTE (1988).
7. I specifically refer here to voter registration laws. For accounts of these laws and
their deleterious effect on actual voter participation, see id. at 17-21; Dayna L.
Cunningham, Who Are to Be the Electors? A Reflection on the History of Voter Registration
in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 370 (1991); Steven J. Rosenstone &
Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Effect of Registration Laws on Voter Turnout, 72 AM. POL.
SCL REV. 22 (1978); Mark T. Quinlivan, Note, One Person, One Vote Revisited: The
Impending Necessity of Judicial Intervention in the Realm of Voter Registration, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 2361 (1989). The importance of these laws is outlined by the fact that
registered citizens do turn out to vote. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 6, at 19;
Quinlivan, supra, at 2377 n.109. Reflecting our typical political approach to these
laws, a number of bills have been introduced and, not surprisingly, rejected by
Congress. Id. at 2388 n.171. Encouragingly, the National Voting Registration Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-1 to 197 3gg-10 (Supp. V 1993), which became law in January 1, 1995
and was challenged on, inter alia, Tenth Amendment federalism grounds, was
recently upheld by the Ninth Circuit. Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, No. 95-673, 1995 WL 642293 Gan. 22, 1996).
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would "guard against the cabals of a few."8 So long as a broad
diversity of views and interests are represented at the political
marketplace, any realistic fear of a democratic deficit seems con-
vincingly deflated
Would our fears resurface, however, if specific factions within
society remained systematically shunned aside, outside the political
realm? For African Americans, much too tragically, such has been
the course of American constitutional and political reality. Our
original Constitution,'0 and later the Supreme Court,11 did not ac-
cord Black persons the same degree of humanity as their White
counterparts. This kept free and enslaved African Americans outside
the political establishment on a de jure basis. The Civil War and the
Reconstruction amendments that succeeded it12 sought to remedy
these grim conditions while transforming the original understand-
ing of the federal-state relationship. 3 Shortly after, however, the
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 4, at 82.
9. It has also been suggested that an estoppel rule may apply, where those who do
not participate are deemed to be giving up their right to have a say in the decision-
making process. See James Bryce, The Nature of Public Opinion, in PUBLIC OPINION
AND PROPAGANDA 10 (Daniel Katz et aL eds., 1954) ("[I]t must be taken that those
who do not vote leave their will in the hands of those who do .. "). But see Julian
Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1515 (1990) ("[The
estoppel] argument... enjoys diminished force if we have built obstacles into the
process that make ballot measures inaccessible to certain groups."). In any event,
application of this rule might not radically affect certain electoral outcomes. See
Stephen E. Bennett & David Resnick, The Implications of Nonvoting for Democracy in the
United States, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 771, 789 (1990) ("[Njonvoting could introduce a skew
into the policymaking process, although its size and direction varies from issue to
issue."). But see STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN M. HANSEN, MOBILIZATION,
PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 245 (1993) ("In fact, Americans need
not look very far back into their history for incontrovertible evidence that who
participates matters.").
10. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. WIECE, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 62-105 (1977) (pointing out that the
original Constitution included up to ten slave clauses, including U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,
cl. 3 (apportioning Congressional representatives among states based on population,
determined by all free persons and three-fifths of the slaves); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL
15 (vesting power in Congress to suppress insurrections, including those by slaves);
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (prohibiting states from freeing runaway slaves); and U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4 (obligating federal government to protect states from domestic
violence, including slave insurrections)).
11. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (holding, in reference to the
Declaration of Independence, that "neither the class of persons who had been
imported as slaves, nor their descendants... were then acknowledged as a part of the
people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable
instrument").
12. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
13. See THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, CENTENNIAL VOLUME 31 (Bernard
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Redeemers took over southern politics, and struck a compromise not
at all beneficial to the interests of emancipated slaves.1 Within the
next few decades, Jim Crow and its various disenfranchising
practices relegated African Americans to second-class status. 5
It was not until the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education6
and the courageous determination of the Warren Court," that
African Americans finally began to emerge from the appalling
shadow of their political misery. Congress joined this movement a
decade later, and sought to guarantee political equality through the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.' This vision, where all citizens stand
alongside one another in the political realm, was soon thwarted by a
number of political practices that prevented racial minorities from
participating in elections or diluted their votes.19
Considering these conditions, and the grim prognosis sur-
rounding them, a few commentators have suggested various alter-
natives to simple majoritarian practices. Most of these alternatives,
however, have met intense resistance.0 The most telling example is
Schwartz ed., 1970) ("[I]t was the states that were the primary guardians of their
citizens' rights and iberties .... With the Fourteenth Amendment, all this was altered.
That amendment called upon the national government to protect the citizens of a state
against the state itself. Thenceforth, the safeguarding of civil rights was to become
primarily a federal function."); Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom:
Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 627, 649 (1994) ("[Ilt is not disputed that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to change the relationship between the states and the federal government.").
14. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877, at 581-82 (1988) (delineating the terms of the "Bargain of 1877," which ensured a
peaceful inauguration for Rutherford B. Hayes in exchange for "a decisive retreat
from the idea, born during the Civil War, of a powerful national state protecting the
fundamental rights of American citizens"). See generally C. VANN WOODWARD,
REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF
RECONSTRUCTION (1951).
15. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d. rev. ed.
1974).
16. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COx, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968) (describing constitutional developments governing
race relations, the operation of the political process, and the administration of criminal
justice under the Warren Court); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN
AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (1983).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971. 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988). For the stringent debate on the
purpose of the Act, see infra note 33.
19. For examples, see infra part II.A.2.a.
20. These proposals have not met such resistance everywhere, as they have been
put into practice in some places. For examples of certain localities that have instituted
cumulative and limited voting schemes, see Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings:
The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 173, 223-36 (1989), and two courts have employed the "rotation in office"
mechanism to ensure that black officeholders "for a fair proportion of the time ...
will occupy positions of formal power." Id. at 241.
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that of Professor Lani Guinier, whose nomination to head the Civil
Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice was rescinded by
President Clinton soon after a political furor erupted in Washington
over her "profoundly anti-democratic" ideas.2 American political
society's strong aversion to anything other than simple majoritar-
ianism, where fifty percent of all participating voters plus one will
carry the day, has led it to reject a series of promising suggestions
that could help ameliorate current participatory and representational
inequalities.2 Instead, our polity has insisted on operating under the
restrictive confines of the majoritarian paradigm, disregarding this
paradigm's pervasively adverse consequences for certain minority
groups.
In this Note, I steer away from the current substantive debates
surrounding the Voting Rights Act, its various amendments, and the
"correct" way of interpreting 23its intended benefits and con-
stitutionally accepted mandates. Instead, I indirectly join the many
"radical" voices advocating for a departure from the majoritarian
stranglehold-the decision-making process where fifty percent plus
one of the voting population carry the election. I do so not by
suggesting yet another mechanism by which representatives may be
elected, but by critiquing the perceived underpinnings of our
democratic system of government. I do not profess to delineate a
definitive interpretation of American democracy, but rather to show
what it is not required to be. More specifically, I directly confront the
majoritarian foundation upon which America's political society
arguably rests, and posit that our reliance on the simple majoritarian
paradigm is unwarranted.2 In short, I argue that democracy entails
21. Interview with Clint Bolick, conservative activist, on Morning Edition (National
Public Radio broadcast, June 1, 1993), quoted in Stephen L. Carter, Foreword to LANI
GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY at ix (1994).
22. While this is, in my opinion, the overarching reason, it is not the only reason.
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Gimme Five: Non-Gerrymandering Racial Justice, NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1993, at 16, 17 ("The most common concern about cumulative
voting is that it is too confusing. But this reflects an instinctive fear of new voting
procedures rather than informed experience.").
23. For a glimpse of some of the voices involved in this debate, see infra note 33.
24. Skepticism may surface at this stage for those who accord American democracy
a more expansive definition. See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 45-53 (2d ed. 1995) (labeling American democracy
as a "constitutional democracy," a political hybrid of constitutionalism and
democracy); Walter F. Murphy, Civil Law, Common Law, and Constitutional Democracy,
52 LA. L. REV. 91, 109-13 (1991) [hereinafter Murphy, Civil Law] (merging
constitutionalism and democracy into a notion of constitutional democracy). I
embrace such alternatives, yet argue that the Supreme Court, with its infatuation with
political process theory, does not always do the same. Instead, it accords
Majority Rule
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anything from unanimous decision-making to simple, fifty-percent-
plus-one majority rule.
In Part I, I delineate the basic normative understandings of
democratic politics. More specifically, I address the concepts of par-
ticipation and representation, notions that play a central role in
democratic theory. In order to critique our present democratic
conditions, a fundamental understanding of democracy's basic
assumptions is necessary. In Part II, I turn to the empirical data and
address how the conclusions of Part I affect racial minorities. I note
that not only is voting turnout anemic, but that minority groups
participate in disproportionately low numbers. Moreover, notions of
representation are also adverse to the interests of racial minorities.
These conditions and their implications for the normative as-
sumptions delineated in Part I are also examined. In Part III, I
present some of the proposals that seek to make the political process
more responsive to electoral and representational realities. I do not
intend here to provide new insights but simply seek to provide a
survey of the various proposals available. In Part IV, I turn to the
heart of the Note, and address the questionable position held by
simple majoritarianism. I provide an overview of both our norma-
tive understandings of democratic ideals and our misunder-
standings about the privileged status of majority rule. Most
importantly, I explore the majoritarian terrain, and critique our
increased reliance on simple majority rule as the democratic
procedure of choice. I also travel the heavily charted constitutional
landscape to unearth any evidence equating American democracy
with simple majority rule. Upon reviewing the whole, I conclude
that simple majority rule is not a democratic imperative. Thus,
perceived deviations from its suffocating stranglehold should not be
defeated without careful, reflective study.
majoritarianism a privileged status. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988
Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 46 (1989) ("The
Court's decision making, and its implicit view of its institutional role, is highly
majoritarian ...."); see also CLAUS OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM: CONTEMPORARY
TRANSFORMATIONS OF WORK AND POLITICS 261 (John Keane ed., 1985) (labeling the
"'democratic' rules of decision of the majority principle" as "apparently self-evident
and traditionally secured"); ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS 2 (1965) (upholding
majority rule as American democracy's fundamental principle); Pamela S. Karlan, The
Right to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1718 (1993)
(asserting that majoritarianism occupies a "privileged position . . . in American
political theory"); Frederick Rosen, Majorities and Minorities: A Classical Utilitarian
View, in NOMOS XXXII: MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES 24, 32 (John W. Chapman & Alan
Wertheimer eds., 1990) ("The confusion of popular sovereignty in a constitutional
democracy with majority rule... is commonplace.").
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I. DEMOCRATIC IDEALS: SOME OBSERVATIONS OF ITS NORMATIVE UNDERSTANDINGS
As a self-professed democratic polity, American society pur-
ports to place its citizens at the core of its democratic aspirations. For
this reason, normative notions of participation and representation
define in great measure the essence of American democracy. In this
Part, I explore both concepts and delineate the essay's theoretical
foundation.
A. Participation
To deserve the democratic denomination, the people must take
part in political affairs. 5 At first glance, such a definition must
certainly entail citizen involvement in the affairs of their
community,26 a fact from which American democratic under-
standings do not deviate. But unlike the democracy of ancient
Athens, where citizens could (and were indeed expected to) step
forth and take part directly in the affairs of their polis, 27 American
citizens rule indirectly, through their chosen representatives. As a
result, the voting booth is elevated to great heights.28 The size of the
populace, coupled with the complex nature of American political
society, does not allow for any other approach.29
25. This is a literal definition of democracy. See infra text accompanying note 136.
26. See CAROL E. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970)
(discussing the role of participation in the theory of democracy).
27. See, e.g., A.H.M. JONES, ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY (4th ed. 1966); JOSIAH OBER,
MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POWER OF
THE PEOPLE (1989).
28. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society."); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (referring to "the political franchise of voting" as a
"fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights"); cf. JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1980) (positing that the
process of constitutional amendment has been mainly concerned with political
inclusion and "increasing popular control of our government"); Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 621 (1993) ("In fact, seven of the
fourteen amendments enacted since the Civil War explicitly extend the franchise or
remove obstacles to its exercise.").
29. See THE FEDERALIST No. 52, supra note 4, at 320 (James Madison); HERBERT
STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 15-23 (1981); see also JOHN S. MILL,
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 80 (1991) ("[Slince all can not, in
a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some
very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect
government must be representative."); Simon Sterne, Proportional Representation, in
REPRESENTATION 73, 75 (Hanna F. Pitkin ed., 1969) ("For nations having an extensive
territory, great variety and division of employment, and that intense competition in
Majority Rule
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Thus, in American political society, ruling is narrowly defined
as casting votes for representatives and subsequently com-
municating with those representatives.? For this reason, "[tiuming
out to vote is the most common and important act of political par-
ticipation in any democracy."3' America's strong commitment to the
unhindered extension of the franchise is reflected in the 1965 Voting
Rights Act,32 which sought "to include all Americans in the liberal,
democratic electoral process."3
every human activity which make exclusive devotion to one business of life a
condition of success, the form of democracy as the Athenians had it is utterly
impracticable .... ).
It is important to note how this argument, developed earlier by Montesquieu, see
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 120 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949),
was used mainly by the Anti-Federalists, who argued for decentralized political
institutions and the primacy of localized, small communities. See STORING, supra, at
15-23; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 36
(1985); cf. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 149 (Swallow Press 1954)
(1927) ("The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes
the idea of democracy."); id. at 213 ("Democracy must begin at home, and its home is
the neighborly community."). This argument was turned on its head by the
Federalists, who replied that a large territory was exactly what the new American
state needed, as it served as the correct antidote to factionalism. THE FEDERALIST No.
10, supra note 4, at 82-84. See generally Wilson C. McWilliams, The Anti-Federalists,
Representation, and Party, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 12 (1989).
30. See VERBA & NIE, supra note 2. The right to vote, however, is not equally
understood by all. See infra note 34.
On the issue of conversation between constituent and representative, see Karlan,
supra note 24, at 1716 n.48. For a discussion of its empirical quality, see Donald R.
Kinder & Don Herzog, Democratic Discussion, in RECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC
PUBLIC 347, 348 (George E. Markus & Russell L. Hanson eds., 1993) ("Democratic
discussion may be more than just a romantic dream.").
31. John Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 246, 246 (1993); see
also Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting
Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) ("Realistically speaking, most citizens participate
in the process of governing primarily by selecting representatives . .
32. 42 U.S.C. §§1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988).
33. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1083 (1991). This assessment is echoed by
many commentators. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political
Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1838
(1992) ("The forces behind the Voting Rights Act assumed that curbing black
disenfranchisement would lead inevitably to the right to full political equality,
including the election of the representatives of choice of the black community.");
Karlan, supra note 20, at 183 ("[The Voting Rights Act of 1965] was intended to
dismantle an entrenched system of white supremacy that kept blacks 'economically,
socially and politically downtrodden, from the cradle to the grave."') (citations
omitted). Not all commentators and judicial actors share this optimistic view. See,
e.g., Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2592 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The statute
was originally perceived as a remedial provision directed specifically at eradicating
discriminatory practices that restricted blacks' ability to register and vote in the
segregated South."); ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 18 (1987) ("What the Voting Rights Act
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The franchise, in short, occupies a central position in American
democratic society. InstrumentallX, such a conclusion points to the
franchise's aggregative function. Symbolically, the act of voting
carries with it powerful democratic undertones, for it is during such
moments that citizens officially join the larger political community
and their status as community members, as well as the community's
intrinsic democratic worth, get objective validation.3'
A third view of participation, however, significantly departs
from the symbolic and instrumental accounts. In recent years,
American political society has witnessed a "revival" of civic re-
publicanism.3' The civic republican ideal revolves around civic
virtue,' defined as "the willingness of citizens to subordinate their
accomplished-black enfranchisement-was precisely what it aimed to do.").
34. See Lani Guinier, (E)racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 109, 126 (1994) ("[Tlhe right to vote essentially consists of three different rights:
the right to cast a ballot, the right to cast a ballot that 'counts,' and the right to cast a
ballot that embodies a fair chance to influence legislative policy-making."); Karlan,
supra note 31, at 5-6 ("[The right to vote's] functional importance lies in the way that
voting influences government .... "); Karlan, supra note 24, at 1709-19 (equating
voting with "aggregation," "participation," and "governance"). For a competing view,
see Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2592 (equating the right to vote with an individual's ability to
cast a ballot); Karlan, supra note 31, at 29-30 ("Courts have come to treat the... right
to 'participate in the political process' as nothing more than the elemental ability to
cast a ballot.").
35. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case
of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1600 (1993) ("Voting creates 'a personal
value,' or a symbolic statement of belonging, by the mere act of casting a ballot.");
Karlan, supra note 31, at 5 ("[Vioting, regardless of whether one's views prevail,
announces that the voter is a full member of the political community."). See generally
Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330 (1993) (arguing that
voting affirms individuals' membership in a community).
36. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It
Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate
Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 29;
Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). For a sample of
the social science literature, see Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civil Republicanism,
and American Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1541, 1542 n.2 (1993). For some of the various critiques to the civic republican ideal,
see Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591 (1988); Derrick Bell &
Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988); Gey,
supra; Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic
Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REV.
267 (1991).
37. See Gey, supra note 36, at 806 ("[C]ivic virtue is certainly the centerpiece of the
republican conception of government."); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1986)
("Republicanism's 'animating principle' is said to be civic virtue."); Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543,
552 (1986) ("The good of the commonwealth requires that citizens subordinate their
private interests, and the fostering of civic virtue is the mechanism by which they may
be expected to do so."); Sunstein, supra note 29, at 31 (defining the country's first
Majoity Rule
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private interests to the general good."
According to this democratic conception, political institutions
should be designed in ways that encourage discussion and debate
among the polity, for it is through discussion that "people can, in
their capacities as citizens, escape private interests and engage in
pursuit of the public good."" Moreover, civic republicanism de-
mands equal access to the political process and does not simply limit
political participation to the act of voting." That the republican
vision is "highly participatory and inclusionary4 1 attests to the high
premium it places "on political participation as an independent
good."'42 Not only does society benefit under the republican con-
ception of government, but so does each individual citizen. Par-
ticipation, by its very nature, enriches the lives of all.4
B. Representation
The Founders relied on representation as the basis of their
emerging political society. This was so, they concluded, because the
ancient Athenian practice of direct participation was not possible, as
it "admit[s] of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.' In order to
control these factional spirits we must elect representatives whose
acumen and intelligence will guide us all to the attainment of the
common good.45
conception as republican and its animating principle as civic virtue).
38. Sunstein, supra note 29, at 31.
39. Id. It follows not only that "debate and discussion help to reveal that some
values are superior to others," id. at 32, but also that "through discussion people can,
in their capacities as citizens, escape private interests and engage in pursuit of the
public good," id. at 31; cf. DEWEY, supra note 29, at 208 ("The essential need... is the
improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion.");
CARL SCHMITr, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 3 (Ellen Kennedy trans.,
MIT Press 1988) (1923) (describing the important role played by discussion and
openness in "parliamentary arrangements.").
40. Sunstein, supra note 29, at 31.
41. Michelman, supra note 37, at 20.
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1556 (1988).
43. Cf. MILL, supra note 29, at 171 ("[Plolitical life is indeed in America a most
valuable school .... ).
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 4, at 81.
45. See Madison's view in Federalist No. 57, where he argues that:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers
men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common
good of the society-, and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for
keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.
THE FEDERALIST No. 57, supra note 4, at 350 Uames Madison). Such a conception of
representatives as elites able to overcome the self-interested masses is seen
throughout The Federalist Papers. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 4, at 412
[VOL. 1:195
WINER 1996]
In order to analyze American political society, and its
democratic character, it is first necessary to define the term "rep-
resentation." At first glance, most of us would readily agree that the
term has a definitive meaning. Upon careful thought, however,
definitive answers are not readily available." Professor Harold Foote
Gosnell, for example, in an attempt to define the term precisely,
reviews the definitions of a number of influential political theorists,
7
and finding them inadequate submits his own: "Representation of
an individual in a society is a condition which exists when the
characteristics and acts of a person in a position of power in the
society are in accord with the desires, expressed and unexpressed, of
the individual." 8
Professor Hanna Pitkin, in The Concept of Representation,
identifies four competing views on the representation question.49 She
first presents an "authorization" view of representation, originally
developed into a theoretical system by Hobbes,s° which "defines
representing in terms of a transaction that takes place at the outset,
before the actual representing begins. To the extent that he has been
authorized, within the limits of his authority, anything that a man
does is representing.'751 This view holds a narrow conception of
representation and stresses "only the representative's capacity to
bind others, not his obligation to conform to some external standard
or act in accord with special considerations." 2
(Alexander Hamilton) (speaking of Article II's electoral system and explaining that
"the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the
qualities adapted to the station").
46. This difficulty emanates from the fact that it is impossible for an individual to
be entirely satisfied with the views of his or her chosen candidate. See, e.g., HANNA F.
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 220 (2d ed. 1972) ("[Tlhe political
representative has a constituency and constituents, not a principal He is chosen by a
great number of people; and, while it may be difficult to determine the interests or
wishes of a single individual, it is infinitely more difficult to do so for a constituency of
thousands."); ROBERT P. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 33 (1970) ("If a citizen
cannot even find a candidate whose views coincide with his own, then there is no
possibility at all that he will send to the [governing body] a genuine representative. In
practice, voters.., must make compromises with their beliefs before they ever get to
the polls."); Richard F. Fenno, Jr., U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An
Exploration, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 883 (1977) (identifying the complex nature of
constituencies, as perceived by members of Congress themselves).
47. Harold F. Gosnell, Pleasing the Constituents: Representative Democracy, in
REPRESENTATION, supra note 29, at 98, 99-104 (providing the definitions given by the
likes of Sir Thomas Hobbes, James Wilson, Lord Brougham, Thomas Hare, Robert
von Mohl, Edward McChesney Sait, Charles Beard and John D. Lewis, and Rousseau).
48. Id. at 104 (emphasis omitted).
49. PITKIN, supra note 46, at 38.
50. Id. at 14-37.
51. Id. at 39.
52. Id. at 49.
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Pitkin then contrasts this formalistic view with the "ac-
countability view," a view she finds "diametrically opposed to that
of the authorization theorist."3 As its name suggests, this view
renders the representative more answerable to his or her consti-
tuents. The constituents are free to choose a different representative
if dissatisfied by the representative's actions.
A third view of representation focuses on what the repre-
sentative body should look like, and specifically on the rep-
resentatives themselves. One subset of this view stipulates that to be
representative, a legislature's composition must be an accurate map
of the nation, a portrait of the people, an accurate reflection of the
various public interests.-4 Another subset focuses on the symbolic
nature of representation. In this sense, "[t]he crucial test of political
representation will be the existential one: Is the representative
believed in?"55 Political representation thus becomes a "state of
affairs, not an acting for others but a 'standing for'; so long as
people accet or believe, the political leader represents them, by
definition.' Ultimately, it is crucial for the people to believe in the
symbol, not the activities undertaken by the representative.
A final view of representation centers on "representation as an
acting for others, an activity in behalf of, in the interest of, as the
agent of, someone else."7 A vast array of analogies have been
suggested for the representational role:
The representative has been variously likened to or defined as
an actor, an agent, an ambassador, an attorney, a commis-
sioner, a delegate, a deputy, an emissary, an envoy, a factor, a
guardian, a lieutenant, a proctor, a prosecutor, a proxy, a
steward, a substitute, a trustee, a tutor, and a vicar.'
This view, unlike the authorization account, refers to limits on the
representative and to standards that require adherence.
In sum, issues of representation are thorny and complicated,
and raise vexing questions of political philosophy. Among all the
complexities, however, a minimal democratic requirement must be
met. This is John Stuart Mill's view, as expressed in Considerations on
Representative Government: "It is an essential part of democracy that
minorities should be adequately represented. No real democracy,
53. Id. at 55.
54. Id. at 60.
55. Id. at 102.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 113.
58. Id. at 119.
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nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it."'  If
democracy means anything, Mill explains, it means rule by all the
people, not just a select, biased sample of them. Whether American
practices empirically conform to Mill's understanding is one of the
questions explored in the next section.
II. AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, RACIAL MINORITIES, AND EMPIRICAL REALITIES
As a direct response to blatant franchise restrictions and im-
pediments against racial minorities, Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. The Act's optimistic stance soon proved
unattainable, for Southern conservative forces resisted the Act's
"broad vision"6 and continued to restrict racial minorities from
accessing the ballot box. This was done not in a "frontal and
obviously impermissible manner but with . . . 'legal dodges and
subterfuges .... "' 1 In response, voting rights jurisprudence shifted
away from the underlying purposes and vast potentialities of the
Act itself, trading the "genuine protection of minority rights for a
claim of fairness based on electing a few minorities simply to
promote an ideal of descriptive representation."6 2
In this Part, I discuss the overt state practices that have served
to restrict minority access to the ballot box. These practices were
carried on before 1965 under the constitutional rubric of "political
questions," an area that the Court deemed to be outside the judicial
realm. The Court did intervene in some areas before 1965.6
However, it was not until the passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 that overt state activities came to a federally mandated end.
After the Act's passage, state political actors feigned adherence
while subverting the Act's letter and intent through serious covert
practices. Moreover, political attitudes concerning participation have
59. MILL, supra note 29, at 151.
60. Lani Guilder, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Where Do We Gofrom Here?,
in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 283,
284 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992). The vision upon which the
Act is premised, Professor Guinier asserts, encompasses both "political equality and
empowerment." Id. at 284-85.
61. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES
IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 60, at 22 (quoting Congressman Emanuel Celler,
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee as well as floor manager of the Act). For
concrete examples of the various circumventive practices that developed as a
response to the Act, see infra part II.A.2.a.
62. Guinier, supra note 60, at 283. For a fuller description of this position, which
Professor Guinier labels "the theory of black electoral success," see Guinier, supra note
33.
63. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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also affected the voting turnouts of particular social groups. I
address these aspects of political participation in turn.
A. The Quest for Minority Participation
1. Pre-1965: Overt Devices
During the tumultuous 1860s, a trio of transformative amend-
ments" made their way into the constitutional text and struck at the
heart of Southern racial politics. These Reconstruction amendments
not only included recently emancipated slaves into the consti-
tutional community,s but also sought to extend the franchise to all
its citizens." However, a few years after the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Compromise of 1877 was struck,67 and Black
Americans were once again left at the mercy of their southern White
neighbors." That the Voting Rights Act was deemed necessary "[t]o
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States"6 illustrates the extent to which the Fifteenth Amendment's
promising language went largely unfulfilled a century after its
passage.
Among the various disenfranchising practices defiantly enacted
by those unwilling to accord the Fifteenth Amendment its due def-
64. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
65. U.S. CONSI. amend. XIV.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
67. See supra note 14.
68. See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 9, at 197-205. Jim Crow legislation,
which reared its ugly head fifteen years later and lasted for well over half a century,
illuminates the extent to which southern society relegated its black counterparts to
second-class citizenship. J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights and the Two
Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 60, at 139-41.
69. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973 bb-1 (1988). For
further evidence, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) ('The
Voting Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress' firm intention to rid the country of racial
discrimination in voting."); see also Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1359, 1360 (1995) (reviewing QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH (Chandler
Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)) ("[The Act was] [f]irst enacted in 1965 as a
response to the ingenious and successful array of tools Southern jurisdictions forged to
deny Blacks political participation for nearly 100 years after the Fifteenth Amendment
.... "). One should not be surprised if political purposes prompted this piece of
legislation. According to Carmines and Stimson, for example, the Act's underlying
intention was "to add large numbers of likely Democratic voters to the voting
population, trying to offset defections among white voters . ... EDWARD G.
CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 49 (1989). In their view, this developed as a result of
Goldwater's "calculated use" of race as a new issue cleavage, which in fact upset the
long established Democratic southern majority. Id. at 187-88.
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erence were poll taxes,70 grandfather clauses,"1 white primaries,7 the
ever-present threats of violence and economic reprisal," and literacy
tests, which by 1944 were "still operative in all states of the former
Confederacy except Arkansas and Texas."74 While some of these
practices displayed more ingenuity than others, the end results were
substantially the same: the Fifteenth Amendment's voting guarantee
was unavailable to a considerable segment of the American public.
2. Post-1965: The Saga Continues...
Passage of the Voting Rights Act signaled a new dawn in Amer-
ican political society. According to the Act's explicit text, for ex-
ample, no longer could a state or political subdivision establish a
"qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure... in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color... ,75 Unsurprisingly, the optimism surrounding the Act
soon gave way to the grim realities of southern politics as states
70. This practice was declared unconstitutional with regard to federal elections by
the U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXIV. The state counterpart was deemed unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court soon after. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
71. Somewhat surprisingly, this practice was held to violate the Constitution, fifty
years before passage of the Act, in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
72. This practice was held impermissible by the Supreme Court in Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), as were preprimary selections, in Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953).
73. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 9, at 204; Kousser, supra note 68, at 141-42.
74. Davidson, supra note 61, at 13. During the hearings on the Voting Rights Act,
Congressman Celler catalogued a number of disenfranchisement practices
implemented by white majorities including the following:
withholding information about registration, voting procedures or party activities
from black voters; giving inadequate or erroneous information to black voters, or
failing to provide assistance to illiterate voters; omitting the names of registered
voters from the lists; maintaining racially segregated voting lists or facilities;
conducting reregistration or purging the rolls; allowing improper challenges of
black voters disqualifying black voters on technical grounds; requiring separate
registration for different types of elections; failing to provide the same
opportunities for absentee ballots to blacks as to whites; moving polling places or
establishing them in inconvenient or intimidating locations; setting elections at
inconvenient times; failing to provide adequate voting facilities in areas of greatly
increased black registration; and causing or taking advantage of election day
irregularities.
Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523,
557-58 (1973).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1989).
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easily circumvented the Act's explicit mandates. However, the states
were not the sole culprits in the ultimate disenfranchisement of
racial minorities; social and psychological factors also played an
important role. This section explores both occurrences.
a. State Practices
Lest Black voters assume that the Voting Rights Act would
serve to further their political interests, politicians quickly de-
veloped a number of practices intended to circumvent the leg-
islation's letter and spirit. "Candidate diminution," as an example,
involved the abolition of political offices, the extension of terms for
White incumbents, and the imposition of "stiff formal requirements
for qualifying to run in primaries or general elections, e.g., high
filing fees, numerous nominating petitions or complex oaths."76
Another such practice, that of vote dilution, was just as per-
verse. Some of its manifestations included:
racial gerrymandering; decreasing the black proportion in a
town or county by annexation, deannexation, or consol-
idation; imposing a majority runoff requirement, which can
enable white voters to mobilize behind a single white
candidate in the runoff after having split their votes among
several whites in the first election; holding at-large rather
than district elections, which allows white voters to
overwhelm black ones when the latter are in the minority;
enacting such devices as full-slate laws, numbered-place laws,
and staggered terms, all of which can, under some
circumstances, preclude the use of "single shot" voting by
blacks, a strategy that can help them in at-large systems to
elect black candidates; and "splitting the vote for a strong
black candidate by nominatin additional blacks as 'straw'
candidates for the same office."
The implementation of these practices led to what Professor
Guinier has labeled the "second generation" of voting rights claims:
"qualitative complaint[s] about the weight of the voter's vote.'"
Lawsuits addressing these practices "sought to empower blacks by
76. Derfner, supra note 74, at 555-56.
77. Davidson, supra note 61, at 23 (paraphrasing and quoting Derfner, supra note
74, at 553-55).
78. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1413, 1424 (1991).
[VOL. 1:195
WINER 1996]
providing them with an opportunity to elect officials who would
champion the needs of the black community." In response to these
"second generation" claims, Congress amended section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act to ensure that "the political processes leading to
nomination or election [for public office would be] equally open to
participation by members of [all] class[es] of citizens" protected by
the Act.80
Currently, any gains attained from the 1982 amendments are
"coming under serious attack." 1 We have now entered the "third
generation" of voting rights litigation, where "issues connected with
questions of postelectoral representation and power within elective
bodies" dominate the agenda.82 It is here where voting rights ju-
risprudence finds itself grappling with difficult and important
issues of political sovereignty and representation.8 Based on our
past history, however, this troubled and vastly critical area of the
law will not be resolved in the near future. The struggle for political
participation and democratic rights has only begun.
b. Social and Psychological Factors
The South does not stand alone regarding problems relating to
political participation. In all geographic regions, lack of electoral
participation is a political reality that disproportionately affects ra-
cial minorities and those in the lower socioeconomic strata, both at
the level of interest group formation and maintenance," and at the
level of individual voting behavior.8
i) Interest Group Formation and Maintenance
79. Pamela S. Karlan, Democracy and Dis-Appointment, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1275
(1995) (reviewing GUINIER, supra note 21).
80. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(amending the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988).
81. Karlan, supra note 79, at 1276.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S
VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960); VERBA & NIE, supra note 2; WOLFINGER &
ROSENSTONE, supra note 3; John F. Manley, Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism
I and Pluralism II, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 368 (1983); Jack L. Walker, The Origins and
Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 390 (1983).
85. See, e.g., PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 6; ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 9;
VERBA & NIE, supra note 2; Aldrich, supra note 31; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., American
Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 17 (1986).
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In Federalist No.10, James Madison expounded on his theory of
how to protect society from factional politics. "Extend the sphere
and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common mo-
tive to invade the rights of other citizens .... "86 The more, he tells us,
the merrier. Bring groups to the bargaining table, and the various
interests will counterbalance one another, ultimately permitting the
common good to rise out of the political ashes.
We know today, however, that Madison's optimism was
unjustified. Not all social groups have the same success in coa-
lescing into winning political blocs.87 Racial minorities and those in
the lower socioeconomic levels are particularly unsuccessful here.88
These realities question the fairness and legitimacy of traditional
democratic ideals and may justify a departure from formalistic,
narrow definitions of democracy.
ii) Turnout
"[F]or most Americans, voting is the only form of political par-
ticipation." However, it is a well known fact that many Americans
simply do not vote.90 Consistent with the previous findings, racial
minorities and those in the lower socioeconomic and educational
strata vote at lower rates than do other groups.91
John Dewey hypothesized that "[plerhaps the apathy of the
electorate is due to the irrelevant artificiality of the issues with
which it is attempted to work up factitious excitement. ' 9 While he
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 4, at 83.
87. Compare DEWEY, supra note 29, at 110-42 (arguing that the barriers impeding the
public from organizing into a cohesive self are vast and difficult to overcome) and
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS (1965) (asserting that large groups have an especially difficult time
forming coalitions to pursue goals) with DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991) (explaining how the Civil Rights Movement was
able to overcome collective action problems). See generally Terry M. Moe, Towards a
Broader View of Interest Groups, 43 J. OF POL. 531 (1981) (discussing different theoretical
perspectives on the nature of interest groups).
88. See sources cited supra note 84. Among the various socioeconomic
dimensions-educational attainment, occupation, and income--scholars disagree on
which one has the most profound effect on participation. See Bennett & Bennett, supra
note 2, at 185.
89. WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 3, at 1.
90. See, e.g., PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 6. For the implications of such
practices, see Bennett & Resnick, supra note 9.
91. See sources cited supra notes 84-85.
92. DEWEY, supra note 29, at 124.
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spoke of politics in the 1920s, his point may be relevant to our
present conditions. Psychological factors, after all, do play a vital
role. 3 For example, some citizens fail to vote out of some sense that
their vote is irrelevant to their real concerns.9 Also, a perception of
one's lack of influence and efficacy plays a substantial role in low
voter turnout.95 Absence of a sense of civic duty and political trust,"
lack of political socializationW and political alienation or cynicismr
play a part as well. Moreover, institutional barriers, such as voter
registration laws, play a crucial role. Finally, among other things,
social networks and political mobilizers play a vital role in de-
termining who votes. In short, "[pleople participate in politics
when they get valuable benefits that are worth the costs of taking
part... [and] when political leaders coax them into taking part in
the game. Both sides are necessary."101
That the American people do not participate in politics is cer-
tainly a phenomenon almost unrivaled in western democratic so-
cieties. We must call majoritarianism into question when, in fact,
electoral decisions are made by a "majority" of a relatively small
proportion of Americans. However, participatory concerns might
evanesce, or at least diminish a little, if representative politics were
attuned to the nonparticipating groups' needs and interests. To the
realities behind these representational possibilities and their appli-
cability to the concerns of racial minorities, I now turn.
B. Representational Realities in American Political Society
In Shaw v. Reno03 the United States Supreme Court held that
93. See Bennett & Bennett, supra note 2, at 191-95.
94. See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 9, at 18-19; Paul Abramson & John
Aldrich, The Decline of Electoral Participation in America, 76 AM. POL. SC. REV. 502, 518-
20 (1982); Bennett & Bennett, supra note 2, at 192.
95. See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 9, at 15-16; Bennett & Bennett, supra
note 2, at 193-95.
96. See Bennett & Bennett, supra note 2, at 193, 195.
97. Paul A. Beck & M. Kent Jennings, Pathways to Participation, 76 AM. POL. SCL
REV. 94 (1982).
98. See id. at 95.
99. See supra note 7; HANES WALTON, JR., INVISIBLE POLITICS: BLACK POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR 124-29 (1985).
100. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 9, at 23-37.
101. Id. at 10.
102. See David Glass et al., Voter Turnout: An International Comparison, 6 PUB.
OPINION 49 (1984); Powell, supra note 85.
103. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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North Carolina's twelfth district seat, held at the time by Rep-
resentative Mel Watt, might be unconstitutional because the
district's unusual shape left little doubt that race had played a role
in the drawing of its boundaries.0 4 The Court saw in the districting
plan the message "that [a representative's] primary obligation is to
represent only the members of [one] group, rather than their
constituency as a whole [which is] altogether antithetical to our sys-
tem of representative democracy."1 5
The Court appears to believe in the concept of homogeneous
and cohesive constituencies, for which a representative can speak as
a whole. This approach comports with the "accountability view" of
representation discussed in the previous section. However, a num-
ber of studies tell us that such constituencies simply do not exist."°
Constituencies are complex mixtures of groups and interests, and
while the various interests may sometimes be fully represented, it is
unrealistic to believe that they always will be. The Court's position,
then, simply lacks an empirical basis.
The Court's general understanding of democratic theory, of
which Shaw is but an example, is vastly formalistic. Another such
example is found in Davis v. Bandemer,'O' a political gerrymander
case, where the Court explained that:
the power to influence the political process is not limited to
winning elections. An individual or a group of individuals
who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed to be ad-
equately represented by the winning candidate and to have as
much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters
in the district. We cannot presume in such a situation,
without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate
elected will entirely ignore the interests of those voters.'s
104. Id.; see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995) (observing that
bizarreness is not a necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a threshold
requirement of proof under Shaw, but that it may be persuasive circumstantial
evidence that "race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the
legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines").
105. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
106. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIvES, ROLL CALLS, AND
CONSTITUENCIES (1974) (asserting that representatives respond to the most powerful
segments of their constituencies); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING
DECISIONS (3d ed. 1989) (determining the complexity of constituencies through
interviews of congresspersons); Fenno, supra note 46, at 884-86 (identifying the
complex nature of constituencies, as perceived by members of Congress themselves).
107. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 132. For a competing rendition, see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124,
153 (1971) ("Arguably the losing candidates' supporters are without representation
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Attaining effective representation, under the Court's analysis,
does not simply entail electing one's representative of choice, but
having the ability to apply pressure on the elected representative,
perhaps with as simple a reminder as that one lives and votes in the
representative's jurisdiction." The Court seems to believe that even
an individual voter without the power to affect the electoral out-
come nevertheless can exert such pressure.
However, empirical realities counsel against such a formalistic
approach to representation. Following the premise that represen-
tatives are single-minded seekers of reelection,"O it is likely that a
representative will respond to those constituencies "perceive[d] as
having the greatest potential to affect his reelection probability." ''
As a result, nonvoting groups, such as racial minorities, are at a rep-
resentational disadvantage vis-A-vis other social groups. 112 The Court
since the men they voted for have been defeated .... But we have not yet deemed it a
denial of equal protection to deny legislative seats to losing candidates .... ).
109. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 132. The Court refers here to what Professor Fenno
labels "geographical constituencies." See Fenno, supra note 46, at 884-86. This idea of
geographical constituencies represents, according to Fenno, the "congressman's
broadest view of his constituency .... It is the entity to which, from which, and in
which he travels .... [It] is a legally bounded space... located in a particular place."
Id. at 884.
110. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (1974);
Fenno, supra note 46, at 889.
111. FIORINA, supra note 106, at 122. On this account, Professors Rosenstone and
Hansen provide a similar assessment:
[The simple fact is that democratic government provides few incentives for leaders
to attend to the needs of people who neither affect the achievement of their policy
goals nor influence the perpetuation of their tenure in office. Politicians can serve
either the active or the inactive. The active contribute directly to their goals: They
pressure, they contribute, they vote. The inactive offer only potential, the possibility
that they might someday rise up against rulers who neglect them. Only the rare
politician would pass up the blandishments of the active to champion the cause of
those who never take part.
ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 9, at 247.
112. One may still argue, however, that virtual representation takes place or that
the interests of racial minorities are represented by one of the many national lobbying
groups. See CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION
OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS (1993) (arguing that in the U. S. Congress all
interests have an adequate chance to be represented). In a nation as heterogeneous as
the United States, with intricate constituency arrangements, and with the notion of
Black interests being complex, these arguments lose their appeal. See id.; WALTON,
supra note 99. But compare this view with Professor Ackerman's conclusion:
Caro/ene is utterly wrongheaded in its diagnosis. Other things being equal,
"discreteness and insularity" will normally be a source of enormous bargaining
advantage, not disadvantage, for a group engaged in pluralist American politics.
Except for special cases, the concerns that underlie Carolene should lead judges to
protect groups that possess the opposite characteristics from the ones Carolene
emphasizes--groups that are "anonymous and diffuse" rather than "discrete and
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has consistently refused to acknowledge this reality.
III. PROMOTING PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENT ATIONAL FAIRNESS: SOME PROPOSALS
This section delineates a number of theoretical proposals in-
tended to ameliorate our current participatory and representational
quagmire. The proposals are divided into those practices that seek to
include minority interests into the political discussion and those
attempting to afford these minority interests a qualitative influence
in the legislative outcome. As these proposals are extensively doc-
umented elsewhere, this section simply seeks to delineate their
existential contours.113 Taken as a whole, these ideas are but a few
ways in which the political process may be forced to reflect Amer-
ica's vastly diverse populace in a truly democratic way.
A. Inclusionary Practices
As a direct result of our sad history with respect to the inclusion
of minorities into the legislative arena, it is often the case that simply
introducing a mechanism for electing more proponents of minority
interests to local and national legislatures means a great deal. In this
section, I present a number of prospective mechanisms proposed by
various commentators that would allow for a better reflection of
minority interests.
1. Proportional [Interest] Representation
Under a winner-take-all approach, a party accumulating fifty-
one percent of the vote gets one hundred percent of the power. What
if, instead, the outvoted minority population was also allowed an
opportunity to have its views represented in the legislative arena in
proportion to its electoral showing? This procedure, aptly enough,
has been labeled "proportional representation."'
4
insular." It is these groups that both political science and American history
indicate are systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy.
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-24 (1985).
113. For an exhaustive review of the various methods, see ENID LAKEMAN, HOW
DEMOCRACIES VOTE: A STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (4th rev. ed. 1974).
114. For some of the views in support of proportional representation, see Guinier,
supra note 78, at 1461-76; John R. Low-Beer, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of
Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163 (1984). For some of its problems and
criticisms, see Guinier, supra note 33, at 1144-53; Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket:
Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325,
1361-77 (1987). See generally VERNON BOGDANOR, WHAT IS PROPORTIONAL
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Proportional representation provides an attempt to guarantee a
process where one's vote plays a crucial role even in defeat. Pro-
portional representation tries to accurately reflect a range of in-
terests, thus increasing the probability that representative decisions
will be similar to, or lerhaps even in accord with, those of the
population as a whole.
2. Cumulative Voting
John Stuart Mill put forth a number of proposals that sought to
mitigate what he perceived as a majoritarian bias inherent in po-
litical society. According to one of his ideas, a voter would receive as
many votes as there were available seats in the election. 116 These
votes would then be used by the voter in any way chosen: she could
divide them as she pleased among candidates, or give them all to a
single candidate.
11 7
However, Mill quickly recognized the shortcomings of this
plan. "[R]eal equality of representation is not obtained unless any set
of electors amounting to the average number of a constituency...
[has] the power of combining with one another to return a
representative."1 8
In response to the shortcomings of Mill's plan, Thomas Hare
proposed a modified plan. According to Mill, Hare proposed the
following:
According to this plan, the unit of representation, the quota of
electors who would be entitled to have a member to them-
selves, would be ascertained by the ordinary process of
taking averages, the number of voters being divided by the
number of seats in the House; and every candidate who
obtained that quota would be returned, from however great a
number of local constituencies it might be gathered. The votes
would, as at present, be given locally, but any elector would
be at liberty to vote for any candidate, in whatever part of the
country he might offer himself. Those electors, therefore, who
did not wish to be represented by any of the local candidates,
might aid by their vote in the return of the person they liked
best among all those throughout the country who had
expressed a willingness to be chosen. This would so far give
REPRESENTATION: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES (1984); JENNIFER HART, PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION: CRITICS OF THE BRITISH ELECTORAL SYSTEM 1820-1945 (1992).
115. See sources cited supra note 114.
116. MILL, supra note 29, at 152.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 153.
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reality to the electoral rights of the otherwise virtually
disfranchised minority. 9
In this way, a voter is not constrained by those running for office in
his district, but may choose any candidate from anywhere in the
country. It seems relatively certain that this plan would ensure the
election of candidates who would not otherwise carry a majority
within their district.
3. Limited Voting
Mill presented yet another plan designed to circumvent strict
electoral rules. This plan involved what some commentators labeled
"limited voting."'12 This voting scheme calls for the grant of fewer
votes than there are seats available. In Mill's example, certain
constituencies elect three representatives, but each voter places only
one or two votes.121 Accordingly, Mill explains, "a minority equaling
or exceeding a third of the local constituency would be able, if it
attempted no more, to return one out of three members.12
4. Random Lotteries
Ancient Athenians adhered to a strict conception of democracy.
In this sense, when they asserted that the people ruled, they meant
every word of it. Their commitment to democratic rule was evident
in their procedure for electing political and administrative officers.
Citizens were elected to these offices randomly, without any com-
petency or property requirement. While this proposal may seem
much too radical for modern democracies,'2 ' it would appear less so
if our society adhered to the Athenian notion of isonomia, where all
119. Id. at 153-54. Representational schemes such as cumulative voting have been
proposed in contemporary academic circles. See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 35, at 1632-
34; Karlan, supra note 20, at 231-36; Pildes, supra note 22.
120. See Karlan, supra note 20, at 223-31.
121. MILL, supra note 29, at 151-52.
122. Id. at 152.
123. See OBER, supra note 27.
124. Over ten years ago, a law student proposed "an alternative method of
selecting representatives to legislatures that combines features of four traditional
egalitarian systems: voting, lottery, quota, and rotation." Akhil R. Amar, Note,
Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1283 (1984). The author
proposed his alternative method of selection as a "thought experiment," and it did not
do away completely with voting as a selective scheme. Id. This provides a telling
comment on the radical nature of random selection processes in their pure form.
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citizens are politically equal in a sense much stricter than the one
espoused by American political standards.
B. Structural Remedies Within Representative Bodies
Once representatives are elected to office, it does not always
follow that their electoral victories directly translate into political
influence. For those occasions when the majority in a representative
body may not wish to accord those representatives in the minority
any say in the deliberative enterprise, as well as during the voting
and deal making times, different rules may be necessary. This
section explores a number of possibilities.
1. Super Majorities
If democracy does seek to foster deliberation and thoughtful
decision making, while increasing protection for the "substantive
interests of minority groups,"'12 an effective way to do so is to
demand super majorities, a demand that considerably more than
fifty percent of the voting population agree on a measure in order to
126secure the measure's passage. This is the idea behind the various
constitutional provisions calling for supermajoritarian rules,7
which foster coalition building by requiring a high degree of
consensus.
2. Concurrent Majorities
If, instead of thinking of voters as atomistic individuals in
search of self-fulfillment, one thought of the electoral process as a
contest between a series of competing interests, 28 one's approach to
representational issues would change. While seeking to protect mi-
nority interests from majoritarian excesses, James Calhoun de-
veloped a plan that took this reconceptualization into account. As
Calhoun observed, we may take "the sense of each interest or
125. Karlan, supra note 20, at 246.
126. For a discussion of the supermajority requirement, see id. at 245-48; Karlan,
supra note 31, at 11 n.35.
127. See infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
128. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMocRATIC THEORY 124-51 (1956). For a
fuller development of Professor Dahl's views, see infra text accompanying notes 204-
06; cf. Guinier, supra note 77, at 1461 (advocating interest representation, not just voter
representation).
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portion of the community which may be unequally and injuriously
affected by the action of the government .. . [and] require the
consent of each interest, either to put or to keep the government in
action."' 29 In this way, all interests may in essence have a negative
power over the legislation in question. Thus, groups whose interests
might be bypassed by overzealous majorities under a simple
majoritarian regime may instead have the power to affect this same
legislation in positive ways.
3. Rotation in Office
Election to political office has not always meant direct political
power to influence policy matters. Much too often, the election of
racial minority group representatives to state and local public offices
has brought with it procedural shifts within the offices in question.
These realignments and rule changes, not surprisingly, have served
to permanently relegate newly elected office holders to marginal
positions within the political body."'
To ensure that election to office means not only the right to be
present but also the right to wield political power, the rotation of
elected officials within their given office may be offered as a rem-
edy. 31 In this way, office holders will not permanently be shut out
from political decision making by a priori formal rules; instead,
rotation in office ensures that, "for a fair proportion of the time, they
will occupy positions of formal power.
All of these proposals, in conclusion, present interesting and
diverse reasons for their adoption. I seek not to advance any single
proposal over any other, but instead to point to the potential of each
one, especially in light of the present political context.
The usual response to these proposals is to call them "un-
democratic." However this critique often defines democracy merely
as entailing simple majority rule. Thus, in order to move beyond our
present democratic quagmire, we must rethink critically what
democracy truly stands for, both in theory and in practice. Until
such a redefinition is developed, promising participatory tools will
remain on the democratic shelf.
129. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT 20 (C. Gordon Post ed.,
1953).
130. This is the classic "third generation" voting rights claim. See supra text
accompanying note 82.
131. Karlan, supra note 20, at 241-44.
132. Id. at 241.
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IV. DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND ITS MAJORITARIAN FALLACY
"Democracy, to say something screamingly obvious, is a
complex ideal."13 It is thus unsurprising that the concept of
democracy is vague and ill-defined in modem political theory."M
Our democratic forefathers, the ancient Greeks, did not face such
definitional quandaries. For them, democracy had a very clear
definition: "[A] city in which the people gathered together at a
definite place in one large visible assembly governed the whole
state."'- This definition follows logically from a literal translation of
133. Don Herzog, Democratic Credentials, 104 ETHICS 467 (1994).
134. See OBER, supra note 27, at 3 ("Of course, not all modem proponents of
democracy mean quite the same thing when they speak in its favor .... "); see also
DAHL, supra note 128, at 4 ("[Democratic theory itself is full of compromises-
compromises of clashing and antagonistic principles."); Louis M. Seidman,
Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1585-86 (1988) ("[W]e are not
in agreement about what makes a political system 'majoritarian."'); Ellen M. Wood,
Democracy: An Idea of Ambiguous Ancestry, in ATHENIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 59, 66 (J. Peter Euben et al. eds., 1994)
("The concept of democracy has now become wonderfully elastic .... ). Even if one
concedes that democracy ought to be equated with majority rule, the complexities do
not end. See Guinier, supra note 78, at 1439 ("[Djemocracy as majority rule is not self-
defining. It could mean control of issue outcomes, voting aggregations to maximize
satisfaction, determining the preponderance of opinions or simply decisionmaking by
electorally accountable officials.").
135. JAMES W. HEADLAM, ELECTION BY LOT AT ATHENS 29 (D.C. MacGregor ed., 2d
ed. 1933); see also Josiah Ober, Public Speech and the Power of the People in Democratic
Athens, 26 PS 481, 481 (1993) (asserting that the Greeks took democracy to mean
"'political power wielded actively and collectively by the demos' (Le., all residents of
the state who are culturally defined as potential citizens, regardless of their class or
status)"). But cf. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 125-26 (Cames Lord trans., 1984) (defining
democracy in a number of different ways).
Critics often assail the Athenian system for its systematic exclusion of women,
children, aliens, and slaves from the ranks of citizenship. See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin,
Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of
Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1392 n.4 (1993) ("For example, Athenian
democracy, the fountain of so many democratic images and hopes, was officially
closed to women, slaves, colonial subjects, and aliens."); Butler Shaffer, Comments on
Leonard Liggio's "Law and Legislation in Hayek's Legal Philosophy", 23 Sw. U. L. REV.
539, 543 (1994) (decrying "our tendencies to glorify Athenian democracy when most of
its population was excluded from participation"). To these critiques, Professor Ober
responds:
Oppression of noncitizens is, however, an insufficient explanation for the unique
direction of Athenian sociopolitical development. The limitation of the franchise to
freeborn males is certainly undemocratic by current standards, but to deny the
name democracy to Athens' government, on the grounds that the Athenians did
not recognize rights that most western nations have granted only quite recently, is
ahistorical.
OBER, supra note 27, at 6.
Majority Rule
Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 1:195
the Greek word demokratia: "the people (demos) possess the political
power (kratos) in the state."13 This power could only be exercised
directly, by voting in the Assembly.
Our founding parents understood the limitations inherent in
the Greek democratic scheme.137 It is also clear, based on the con-
stitutional text and various letters and speeches at the time of its
framing, that a representative, republican form of government was
the Framers' favored philosophical scheme.1 8 One may also concede
that some Framers equated republicanism with the majoritarian
principle.13 The architects of our democratic regime conceded
America's inherent sociopolitical limitations and, unlike the system
developed in the Athens of Pericles and Demosthenes, relied on
representation as the linchpin of their democratic aspirations.
1 40
What may not be conceded as easily, if at all, is the notion that
American democracy is "purely" majoritarian."4' In this vein, equat-
ing "we the people" with a strict fifty-percent-plus-one-winner-take-
all rule is not an automatic assertion. If democracy means that the
people rule, the question shifts to determining who these people are
and ascertaining when it is that they in fact speak. Democracy does
not necessarily mean that a simple majority speaks for all the people
136. OBER, supra note 27, at 3; see also THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 108
(T.E. Wick ed., 1982) ("[Our constitution's] administration favours the many instead of
the few; this is why it is called a democracy.").
137. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 4, at 100 (Alexander Hamilton);
THE FEDERALIST No. 18, supra, at 122-23 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton); THE
FEDERALIST No. 55, supra, at 342 (James Madison). Some contemporary writers and
political figures, however, have suggested a series of possibilities by which twentieth
century American democracy may be practiced on a direct basis. See, e.g., WOLFF,
supra note 46, at 37 (proposing a system of "in-the-home voting machines" to record
majoritarian preferences across the nation while in the privacy of one's own home);
Friedman, supra note 28, at 621 (chronicling the American infatuation with voting
through television and 1-900 numbers, and Perot's promise of national electronic town
meetings).
138. See sources cited infra note 285.
139. See infra part IV.B.2.
140. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
141. See Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost
of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 330 (1986) ("It requires a value judgment... [to
conclude] that majoritarianism is the dominant principle in our democratic
government, overriding all other considerations .... "); see also Chemerinsky, supra
note 24, at 75 (contending that majoritarianism has been accorded too much weight as
a democratic value); Walter Lippman, Filibusters and the American Idea, in THE
ESSENTIAL LIPPMANN: A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 219-20
(Clinton Rossiter & James Lare eds., 1963) ("[I]t is a cardinal principle of the American
democracy that great decisions on issues that men regard as vital shall not be taken by
the vote of the majority until the consent of the minority has been obtained.").
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and, thus, must be accorded the utmost legitimacy.
In this section, I first explore the basic philosophical and
historical underpinnings of democratic theory. Then, I turn to the
majority principle itself, and explore its various justifications. Based
on the historical and philosophical record, I conclude that blind
adherence to the simple majoritarian principle is far from
legitimate."'
Once these understandings are developed, I turn to the found-
ing generation, their constitutional blueprint and the intentions
behind the founding generation. Here I explore the nature of simple
majoritarianism from the perspective of those responsible for forging
the basic tenets of American political society. I conclude that the
constitutional text, as well as the various letters and speeches of the
time, provide little conclusive evidence as to the defining democratic
flavor of the emerging American nation.
In sum, this section concludes that American democracy need
not operate as a simple majoritarian regime. This conclusion ques-
tions those critics who cling blindly to simple majority rule as the
American procedure of choice.
142. See DAHL, supra note 128, at 35 ("In practice, however, the attempt to identify
democracy with the unlimited power of majorities has usually gone hand in hand with
an attempt to include in the definition some concept of restraints on majorities.");
LAKEMAN, supra note 113, at 26-27 ("[W]e sometimes forget that the majority principle
... is not necessarily the only right and safe way of resolving a difficulty...."); OFFE,
supra note 24, at 264 ("[T]he legitimating function of the principle of majority rule in
modem capitalist democracies is thoroughly problematic and disputable."); WOLFF,
supra note 46, at 57 (arguing that majority rule, unlike unanimous direct democracy,
does not preserve "the moral autonomy of the individual while conferring legitimate
authority on the sovereign"); Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 75 ("[Mlajority rule is not
normatively superior to other values."). Not surprisingly, there are dissenting views.
See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1115, 1129 n.73 ("[Ilt seems reasonable to assume that majoritarian rule is at
least important enough to justify a general presumption in favor of majoritarian
decisionmaking.").
143. The empirical data also bears out this assertion. Yet, I seek to confront the
majoritarian spell solely in the normative arena, where it provides the toughest
challenge. I am not interested in mobilizing empirical armies while attempting to
rescue democracy from the majoritarian paradigm. For a sample of the empirical
literature, as well as some of its critics, see JOHN BONNER, INTRODUCrION TO THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1986); DENNIS C. MULLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989); Einer
Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE
L.J. 31 (1991); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice,
65 TEX L. REV. 873 (1987); Grofman, supra note 36; Mark Kelman, On Democracy-
Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice
Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson,
Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic
Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990).
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A. Majoritarian Underpinnings: History, Philosophy, and an Empty Search
for lustifications
Democratic theory stands as a continuum. On one extreme, at
least a simple majority must stand behind a decision in order for it
to be labeled "democratic." On the opposite end, a unanimous
decision is required. T4 Curiously, present democratic arrangements
juxtapose these two democratic extremes and present them as the
only democratic choices available. In this section, I conclude that
while democracy may not be able to justify any adherence to the
unanimity principle, it does not require simple majoritarianism in its
stead.
Unanimity must serve as the departing point for any serious
democratic discussion of "the people" and the procedures by which
their voices are heard."4 ' After all, the demos encompasses all citizens
within the territory in question, and "what touches all must be
approved by all."' 6  However, as a result of sociopolitical
impediments found in modern democratic arrangements,47 the
unanimity principle is unavailing as a democratic procedure of
choice. Not only does a unanimity requirement concede too much
power to a minority of as little as one,1 but it also is untenable in a
region as heterogeneous and vast as the United States.
144. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE ESSENTIAL
ROUSSEAU 1, 89 (Lowell Bair trans., 1983) (noting that '"between a tie and unanimity
there are many unequal divisions, any one of which may be made the required
proportion").
145. Blinded by ideological and historical mist, we seem to have forgotten what
democracy ought to stand for. See, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 46, at 27 ("[U]nanimous
direct democracy is the (frequently unexpressed) ideal which underlies a great deal of
classical democratic theory.").
146. ARTHUR P. MONAHAN, CONSENT, COERCION, AND LIMIT: THE MEDIEVAL
ORIGINS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 98 (1987). In modem democratic
arrangements, issues of consent lurk in the background and serve to illustrate the
difficulties inherent in our present sociopolitical and constitutional understandings.
See DON HERzOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989); Hanna
Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-I, 59 Am. POL. SC. REV. 990 (1965) [hereinafter Pitkin
I]; Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-II, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 39 (1966).
147. See infra note 149.
148. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 4, at 147-48 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[In
the Polish Diet,] a single [vote] has been sufficient to put a stop to all their
movements."); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND 56
(Willmoore Kendall trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1985) (conceding that the
unanimity principle would be "less unreasonable if it applied only to the fundamental
provisions of your constitution; for it to apply indiscriminately to every decision of the
Diet, however, is inadmissible from every point of view").
149. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L.
REV. 263, 272 (1992) ("It is impossible to have a government rule a nation of this size
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Strangely enough, this conclusion moves most theorists and
analysts along the continuum to the other democratic extreme,
where simple majority rule resides."' This is a curious move, since a
refusal to adhere to unanimity procedures in no way mandates ad-
herence to the equally extreme majoritarian paradigm. Justifications
for such a move are thus needed.
In this section, I explore the majoritarian terrain. While doing
so, history and philosophy provide the proper context for the anal-
ysis. First, I look to ancient Athens and its democratic practices. In
order to provide a proper context for our current democratic under-
standings, I then trace the development of political practices through
the Middle Ages, up to the emergence of the notion of corporation
and representative majorities. Once these historical foundations are
laid, I turn to John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and present
their influential ideas regarding majoritarianism. I finally, test the
various justifications advanced in defense of simple majority rule.
1. Historical and Philosophical Accounts
Ancient Athenian democracy, widely recognized as the
pinnacle of democratic principles, serves as the proper place of de-
parture for examining the underpinnings of majority rule. Accord-
ing to Professor Saxonhouse, "[it] has become the marvelous model
of popular government and of the reasoned exchange of ideas."'' In
its most important sense, the Athenians adhered to the concept of
isonomia, or political equality. This concept, explained Herodotus,
was itself composed of three distinctive features: selection by lot,
accountability of public officials, and an assembly as a decision-
making body'52
For our present purposes, it is the principle of decision making
under a system that requires every individual, or even a majority, to consent to every
decision."); cf. MARK A. KISHLANSKY, PARLIAMENTARY SELECTION: SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL CHOICE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 128 (1986) ("The expanded county
constituencies of the Protectorate necessarily made unified choice more difficult.");
ELAINE SPIT, MAJORITY RULE 212 (1984) ("Within the confines of the will for the state
or the community, however, unanimity is neither a practical nor an ideal expectation.
At a minimum, action always takes priority over unanimity.").
150. See infra text accompanying notes 167 and 175. For a modem version of this
traditional argument, see WOLFF, supra note 46, at 38 (proposing majority rule as a
solution to the problems inherent in demanding unanimity "in order for [decisions] to
acquire the authority of law").
151. Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient
Theorists, 26 PS 486, 487 (1993).
152. HERODOTUS, THE HISTORY 248 (David Greene trans., 1987). According to
Professor Vlastos, the form of government referred to here is not demokratia per se, but
a form of government-isonomia (rule of the masses)-that in fact preceded it.
Gregory Vlastos, Isonomia, 74 AM. J. PHILOLOGY 337, 337 (1954).
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through an assembly of citizens that is most important. The
magnitude of this Athenian approach is enormous, as all citizens,
independent of wealth or social condition, were allowed to take an
active political role in Athenian affairs. And unlike modern times,
where elected legislators represent large segments of the population,
the concept of representation was nonexistent in ancient Athens.'
3
All decisions, their importance notwithstanding, were made by the
polis as a whole, by a simple show of hands by those citizens present
during the assembly meeting in question. s4
Conversely, some influential Athenian philosophers saw this
system "as a political extreme, the reverse side of tyranny," since it
gave "an unfair advantage to mere numbers over quality and
virtue."'  The Athenian demos ignored such advice, and allowed the
masses to rule, since "[tihe many, of whom none is individually an
excellent man, nevertheless can when joined together be better-not
as individuals but all together-than those [who are best] .... For
because they are many, each can have a part of virtue and prudence
. ... ,, Simple majority vote was all that Athenians deemed
necessary for governmental decisions, even when deciding matters
of utmost importance 19
Centuries later, unanimity procedures emerged as the decision-
making procedure of choice, a shift not at all surprising, considering
the central role played by the Church during this period.1 -8 Perfect
153. Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, in REPRESENTATION, supra note
29, at 1.
154. MOGENS H. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN ASSEMBLY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES
41-44 (1987). It must be noted that ancient Athenian democracy, canonized as
democracy's finest hour, did not grant its citizens complete power to run the polis, as
decrees enacted by the assembly could be legally challenged through the process of
graphs paranomOn. Upon acceptance by the assembly, a citizen could denounce the
newly enacted decree as contrary to a "law in force." The decree would then be
presented to the Diklsterion, "the people's court," which in turn decided whether a
conflict was present. If it did, the decree was immediately declared null and void and
rescindable from the record. See id.; Harvey Yunis, Law, Politics, and the Graphe
ParanomOn in Fourth-Century Athens, 29 GREEK, ROMAN, AND BYZANTINE STUD. 361
(1988).
155. OBER, supra note 27, at 193. Notice Professor Ober's choice of words in the
context of the larger discussion.
156. ARISTOTLE, supra note 135, at 100-01.
157. The trial of Socrates, albeit conducted in front of a different forum (the
people's courts), provides an illustration of the commitment to this principle. That is,
even when a life was on the balance and an arduous decision had to be made, the
Athenians did not deviate from the principle of majority rule. See Plato, Apology, in
FOUR TEXTS ON SOCRATES (Thomas G. West & Grace S. West trans., Cornell 1984); I.F.
STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES (1988).
158. See MONAHAN, supra note 146, at 136-38. The notion of the state as
"confessional, that is . .. restricted and dedicated to preserving the position of the
[VOL. 1:195
W _ER 1996]
harmony was expected within the community, as "there should be
one soul and one heart in God among you,""' and differences of
opinion were viewed as scandalous subjects.'" The Church must be
one, and must speak as such. Unanimity served this principle well.61
During the late twelfth century, the notion of corporation
slowly developed. The concept was defined as "a fictive person, a
group of individual persons having a common interest; the cor-
porate person or corporation was then conceived of as the seat of the
rights and interest of the community as a whole."' 62 Most
importantly for our purposes, it was from this concept that the no-
tion of representative majorities developed. In the words of Pro-
fessor Monahan, "the notion of majority was developing around the
meaning of corporate person as giving legal status to individuals
considered as a group. The majority came to be seen as able to
decide for the corporation, and thus bind any dissenting minority to
the decision made."' 6' Unlike Athenian political practices, where
notions of representation were nonexistent and individual citizens
voted directly, the Middle Ages witnessed the birth of representative
concepts and the notion that a majority of representatives could bind
the populace as a whole.
John Locke sought to develop these democratic understandings
in the philosophical realm. In his Second Treatise, he argued that
passage into civil society involves securing the consent of those in-
volved to make "one Community or Government."'" By consenting
with others to join into civil society, every man "puts himself under
an Obligation to every one of that Society, to submit to the de-
termination of the majority, and to be concluded by it .... "'6 Joining
into civil society with others entails submitting oneself "and all the
power[] necessary to the ends for which they unite into Society"' to
the will of the majority.
Anticipating a main objection to his theory of civil society,
Locke expounded upon the proposition of majority rule as civil
adherents of the dominant religious creed," persisted through the early to mid-
nineteenth century. Joseph C. Heim, The Demise of the Confessional State and the Rise of
the Ideal of a Legitimate Minority, in NOMOS XXXII, supra note 24, at 1, 11-23.
159. MONAHAN, supra note 146, at 137.
160. See id.
161. Even in the Church context, the unaninity principle often proved to be an
impossible ideaL Id. at 142. Preference for unanimity notwithstanding, there were
times when simple majorities carried the election. Id. at 138.
162. MONAHAN, supra note 146, at 114.
163. Id. at 134.
164. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 331 (Peter Laslett ed., 1965)
(emphasis omitted).
165. Id. at 332 (emphasis omitted).
166. Id. at 333.
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society's guiding factor. As he explained:
For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason, be re-
ceived, as the act of the whole, and conclude every indi-
vidual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make
any thing to be the act of the whole: But such a consent is next
impossible ever to be had .... '67
Locke posited that, upon formation of civil society any form of gov-
ernment chosen by the citizens is legitimate. In his own words,
"when they are thus incorporated, [individuals] might set up what
form of Government they thought fit."' " Therefore, in light of the
various constraints inherent in the unanimity principle, majority
rule simply becomes the de facto democratic alternative.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau expressed similar ideas. In The Social
Contract, he expressed his belief as to the indivisibility of the general
will. This will is so obvious and visible that "it can be seen by any-
one with common sense."'' It cannot be represented, so the political
community must deliberate together and enact positive laws. As a
result of these deliberations, the laws acquire legitimate authority
over all members of society. As in the ancient Athenian world,
where all citizens were expected to take part in the affairs of their
polis, Rousseau envisioned a "well-governed republic" where
"everyone hurries to assemblies."' '"
Furthermore, when decisions need to be made, those present at
the assembly cast their votes on the choice they perceive to be ex-
emplary of the general will. The choice with the majority of citizens
on its side carries the day. As Rousseau explained:
Apart from this original contract, a decision of the majority is
always binding on the minority. This is a consequence of the
contract itself. But it may be asked how a man can be free,
and at the same time be forced to conform to wills that are
not his own. How can dissenters be both free and subject to
laws to which they have not consented?1"
He answered this question in the following way:
[T]he question is wrongly formulated. The citizen consents to
167. Id. at 332.
168. Id. at 337.
169. ROUSSEAU, supra note 144, at 85.
170. Id. at 79.
171. Id. at 78.
172. Id. at 88.
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all the laws, even those that are passed against his opposition,
and even those that punish him if he dares to violate one of
them. The unequivocal will of all the members of the state is
the general will; it is through it that they are citizens and free.
When a law is proposed in the assembly, what is asked of
them is not precisely whether they accept or reject the
proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will
that is theirs. In voting, each man gives his opinion on this
question, and the declaration of the general will is drawn
from the count of the votes. When, therefore, the opinion
contrary to mine prevails, it proves only that I was mistaken,
that what I thought was the general will was not. If my
private opinion had prevailed, I would have done something
other than what I had willed, and then I would not have been
free.
173
In a sense, all members of society support the same general will,
which is, by definition, indivisible. As Rousseau explained it, dis-
senters are thus forced by the majority to be free. Those who voted
against the winning proposition simply erred in their judgment. The
majority sets them on the right course.
From the time of the framing of the Constitution, some of our
most esteemed states persons have praised majority rule in equally
laudatory terms. Thomas Jefferson, for example, wrote to Baron F.
H. Alexander von Humboldt that:
[t]he first principle of republicanism (republican democracy)
is, that the lex majoris partis is the fundamental law of every
society of individuals of equal rights; to consider the will of
the society announced by the majority of a single vote, as
sacred as if unanimous, is the first of all lessons in importance
174
Abraham Lincoln expressed a similar idea. As he explained:
A majority ... is the only true sovereign of a free people.
Whoever rejects it does, of necessity, fly into anarchy or to
despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as
a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that,
rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some
173. Id.
174. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron F. H. Alexander von Humboldt (June
13, 1817), in 10 THE PAPERSOFTHOMASJEFFERSON88, 89 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1899).
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form is all that is left.175




Concluding that simple majority rule is the democratic
procedure of choice might seem sensible, especially when contrasted
with its unanimity counterpart. Providing justifications for simple
majoritarian decision making, however, is much harder than one
might think. At first glance, deciding public policy matters on
simple majoritarian grounds is not intuitively better than various
other democratic models.a7 And simply asserting that majoritarian
decision making is a better method than a minoritarian one, as
commentators and judicial actors are prone to do,'78 is not per-
175. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in LINCOLN ON DEMOCRACY, supra
note 1, at 201, 206.
176. See infra part IV.A.2. In all fairness, all arguments for majority rule are not
analogous to Thrasymachus's "the just is the advantage of the stronger" argument.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 15 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968). Some are more tempered. See,
e.g., Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in THEY SPOKE FOR DEMOCRACY:
CLASSIC STATEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN WAY 52, 52-53 (Frederick C. Packard, Jr. ed.,
1958) ("All too will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the
majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the
minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect, and to violate
which would be oppression."); Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in LINCOLN
ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 201, 206 ("A majority held in restraint by
constitutional checks, and limitations, and always changing easily, with deliberate
changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free
people."). Modern exponents of majority rule share this view as well. See HENRY S.
COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 16 (1958) ("[M]ajority rule is...
government within self-imposed restraints."); Jonathan Riley, American Democracy and
Majority Rule, in NOMOS XX)II, supra note 24, at 267, 291 (defining American
democracy as "a logically coherent and distinctive conception of just majority rule").
It is my contention that even this kinder type of majority rule needs justification.
177. Note also that present-day data on racial polarization convincingly deflates
justifications of majoritarian decision making. See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 78, at 1479;
Issacharoff, supra note 33; Kousser supra note 68, at 175. Yet, racial polarization is not
necessary to trump the majoritarian claim. That is, I am willing to deal with majority
rule solely in the normative realm, as I propose that even there one must provide
justifications for majoritarian hegemony.
178. See, for example, Reynolds v. Sims, where the Court stated:
Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative government, it would
seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of
that State's legislators. To conclude differently, and to sanction minority control of
state legislative bodies, would appear to deny majority rights in a way that far
surpasses any possible denial of minority rights that might otherwise be thought to
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suasive either. The question is not whether a majority or a minority
should rule, but instead whether a simple majority of more than fifty
percent is required. Under either rule, minorities do not rule,
although they may block majorities from ruling.1 9
The standard justification for majority rule centers on two
related concepts. First, it is argued that majority rule fosters gov-
ernmental efficiency, as itprovides a process under which a decision
most likely can be made.' Second, if one assumes that the majority
is a fluid and changeable entity, it follows that those finding
themselves as members of the winning coalition will vary in accor-
dance to the decision in question."" This rendition thus ensures that
all citizens will become winners and losers interchangeably.
The first claim depends upon the conclusion that the purpose of
government is to act as efficiently as possible. Under such a
result.
377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964); see also H.B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 187 (1960) ("What is the alternative to the majority principle, to trusting the
majority of the representatives and using our influence upon them? The simple
alternative, for some kind of minority rule, is not usually put forward today plainly
and unashamedly."); J. Roland Pennock, Normative Democratic Political Theory, in 3
ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1, 31 (Samuel Long ed., 1990) ("[Rlule by the
majority, more precisely the denial of minority rule over a majority, constitutes a recog-
nition, an acceptance, and an implementation of the individual's autonomy ....
(emphasis added).
179. This view is succinctly expressed by Professors Buchanan and Tullock, who
write:
When the orthodox theorist suggests that qualified majority voting amounts to
"rule" by the minority, he is referring to the rule for blocking action. If this line of
reasoning is carried to its logical conclusion, we get the paradoxical result that the
rule of unanimity is the same as the minority rule of one. Thus the rule of requiring
unanimity among members of a jury to acquit or to convict becomes equivalent to
the rule that would permit any individual juror to convict or to acquit. Instead of
being at the opposing ends of the decision-making spectrum, as our whole
construction suggests, the unanimity rule and the rule of one become identical. This
paradoxical result suggests clearly that the power of blocking action is not what we
normally mean, or should mean, when we speak of "majority rule" or "minority
rule."
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 259 (1965)
(emphasis omitted). In this sense, then, the choice is often misleading. We must think
of this issue in terms of ruling and not being allowed to rule.
180. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMoCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 138-39 (1989); MAYO, supra
note 178, at 179; Guinier, supra note 78, at 1440-41.
181. See DAHL, supra note 180, at 138-39 ("[If the members of an association need
collective decisions to achieve their ends, and the boundaries of a democratic unit are
taken as a given, then majority rule is required for maximum self-determination
....."); MAYO, supra note 178, at 177-78; cf. Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the
Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 456 (1984) ("The norm of majority rule
implicitly relies on the possibility of some underlying communal identity among
winners and losers.").
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rationale, fifty-percent-plus-one is certainly better than fifty-percent-
plus-two. However, this conclusion does not reveal anything about
majoritarianism's intrinsic worth, or what level of efficiency is re-
quired. And once we depart from the governmental efficiency ra-
tionale, as some notable founders did,182 the claim hardly stands its
ground.
Upon examination of its underlying assumptions, the second
claim also falters. The notion that under majoritarianism people will
find themselves as members of the winning coalition assumes that
democracy primarily entails winning and losing. This is a con-
clusion that one may debate on various grounds. For example, the
civic republican tradition develops a view where citizens aspire not
to achieve ultimate outcomes, but to further notions of civic virtue
and participation.1' Certainly, some representative understandings
also contravene this claim, since voters in both the winning and
losing coalition may expect to be represented by the winning can-
didate.'m And at the congressional level, one can certainly think of
models where the goal is not to defeat one's opponents, but to do
what is right for one's constituency, not to mention the com-
monwealth.'5
Thus, these standard justifications might not serve their re-
quired objectives. However, all is not lost, as a number of con-
ceptual guides may further our quest. We may first seek guidance
from higher law principles:
The primary function of a constitution was to mark out the
boundaries of governmental powers .... In order to confine
the ordinary actions of government, the constitution must be
grounded in some fundamental source of authority, some
"higher authority than the giving out temporary laws" . . .
[which] could be gained if the constitution were created by
"an act of all" ....
182. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 63 (James Madison); see also Jack N. Rakove, The
Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 473, 485 (1988) ("Madison hoped that the
diversity of interests would discourage any majorities from forming until a compelling
conception of public good could somehow emerge to transcend the interplay of
parochial interests.").
183. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
184. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131-32 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(asserting that "a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually
deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate").
185. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
186. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERIcAN REVOLUTION
182-83 (1967) (emphasis omitted); see also MAYO, supra note 176, at 181 (referring to
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Simple majority rule may be the preordained democratic process of
choice, a presocietal source of governmental legitimacy.
Second, utilitarianism might prove helpful.'" Assuming that the
people vote on the laws directly and that those in the majority gain
at least as much benefit from the enacted laws as those in the
minority lose, one may conclude fairly that majority rule "would
necessarily maximize the average benefit of the laws among all
citizens."' The reasons for this conclusion are obvious. If both
assumptions hold and if the majority is able to translate its
satisfaction into voting preferences, a population of one hundred
people will gain at least a satisfaction level of fifty-one and a
dissatisfaction level of forty-nine. So long as majorities hold the key
to decision making, they will always be ensured a favorable out-
come on any single issue.
Finally, adhering to Professor Kenneth May's proof, one may
conclude that majority rule is a necessary consequence of reasonable
requirements."l If one agrees that decisions should be "decisive" (a
choice is actually made), "anonymous" (the decision rule does not
favor some voters over others), "neutral" (all alternatives are equally
valid), and "positively responsive" to majority preferences, it then
follows that "only one decision rule could satisfy all four criteria":
majority rule.1'9 A society is more than justified in adopting a
majoritarian paradigm, as it is the only one able to meet all four
requirements.
All of these justifications, however, appear to be post hoc
attempts to rationalize existing political practices. Moreover, not one
justification alone serves to refute arguments in favor of ma-
joritarianism of the fifty-percent-plus-one variety. Utilitarianism
does not accomplish it, for a unanimity requirement would serve its
purposes in much better ways, as we would get one hundred
arguments "couched in terms of natural 'law' and natural rights" as a defense of the
majority principle).
187. See DAHL, supra note 180, at 142-44 (outlining the dialogue between
majoritarian and utilitarian arguments). For a defense of the classic utilitarian
argument, see Frederick Rosen, Majorities and Minorities: A Classical Utilitarian View,
in NOMOS XXXII, supra note 24, at 24-43.
188. DAHL, supra note 180, at 143. This assumes that intensity levels remain
constant. For a discussion of intensity as part of the democratic equation, see DAHL,
supra note 128, at 90-123 (defining "intensity" preliminarily as "the degree to which
one wants or prefers some alternative"); Willmoore Kendall & George W. Carey, The
"Intensity" Problem and Democratic Theory, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 5 (1968). But see
MAYO, supra note 178, at 178 ("[T]he dilemma is an imaginary one, without political
relevance. Intensity of feeling... has abundant opportunity to make itself felt in the
many political processes which are open. It does not take much to convince the
lukewarm and wavering and so reduce the majority to a minority.").
189. DAHL, supra note 180, at 139.
190. Id. at 139-41.
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satisfied citizens, not just f -one minus the forty-nine unsatisfied
ones. And neither higher law 9 nor Professor May's approach ' does
the trick. The best justification, it then seems, is that majority rule is
the best we can do under prevailing sociopolitical conditions and
that it works better than other systems.' 93 In a cynical, albeit realistic,
way this justification seems as legitimate as any other.
Assuming, arguendo, that simple majorities are the fairest and
most efficient decision-makers available, problems still remain.
Professor Hanna Pitkin, for example, asks:
[C]an majorities never be wrong? Are there no occasions in
the history of mankind when it was right for a dedicated
minority to begin agitating for a revolution, or even to lead or
make a revolution? And finally, why should what the
majority (or any other proportion) of your fellow-subjects
think be binding on you? What justification is there for that?
Why should that obligation seem more basic or natural or
self-evident than the obligation to obey laws and authority?
Because you have consented to majority rule? But then the
whole cycle of difficulties begins again. Z
Does Locke provide any answers? At the outset of his Second
Treatise, Locke offered the following:
[W]hen any number of Men have, by the consent of every
individual, made a Community, they have thereby made that
Community one Body, with a Power to Act as one Body,
which is only by the will and determination of the majority...
. [I]t is necessary the Body should move that way whither the
greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority; or
else it is impossible it should act or continue one Body, one
Community, which the consent of every individual that
united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound
by that consent to be concluded by the majority. 95
191. See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 128, at 45 (arguing that the assumptions
undergirding the idea of natural rights "have tended to dissolve in modern times").
192. For example, promajoritarianism advocates base their conclusions on some of
the notions critiqued above. See supra text accompanying notes 182-85.
193. See MAYO, supra note 178, at 179; WOLFF, supra note 46, at 38; cf. KISHLANSKY,
supra note 149, at 228 (asserting, in reference to early modem England, that "[if
majorities were not preferable they were practical, and practicality-not for the first
time--overcame ideals").
194. Pitkin I, supra note 146, at 994.
195. LOCKE, supra note 164, at 331-32 (emphasis omitted).
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The greater force of the community, according to Locke, carries the
entire body politic in any direction it chooses. This is so simply
because the majority, by definition, is the greater force. Whether
Locke means for the state to move in the direction of the greater
moral force, or he speaks of a movement in fact, is not clear. The
former assumes that the majority in fact accords with the greater
moral force, while the latter simply reduces majoritarianism to a
"might is right" approach. Either rationale, without more, does not
alone provide enough justification.
Professor Stevens conjectures that, based on the available evi-
dence, "[t]he closest Locke seems to come to a justification of ma-
jority rule is one based on pragmatism."'96 In this sense, "a majority
is the minimum needed for society to make a safe bet on the truth,
which draws nearer as the percentage supporting a position in-
creases."' 97 Professor Stevens proceeds to answer Pitkin's question:
[A] majority can surely be wrong. Any group of people may
be wrong: experts, interested parties, legislators, astrologists.
But given Locke's trust in the ability of human beings to
reason, and hence to understand right from wrong, a majority
is the most appropriate Lockean unit to come to a right
judgment. Each individual is likely to make a right
judgment.1
This argument, on its face, is open to serious questioning, as is any
modem argument introducing the notion of "voters" and "rea-
soning" (i.e., "rationality").19 Yet, "[i]f it is true that Locke had faith
196. Jacqueline Stevens, The Reasonableness of John Locke's Majority: Property Rights,
Consent, and Resistance in the Second Treatise, 24 POL. THEORY (forthcoming 1996)
(manuscript at 26, on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
197. Id. at 28. This observation is similar to, if not a mirror image of, Condorcet's
famous theorem, which advanced the theory that, upon confronting two alternatives
and assuming that "the average voter is more likely right than wrong," it follows that
"the probability that a majority is right increases dramatically the larger it is." DAHL,
supra note 180, at 142; see also WOLFF, supra note 46, at 39 ("[Hlistorical observation
may reveal that rule by the majority tends to advance the general welfare better than
any other system of government ...."). For an extended exposition of Condorcet's
argument, see DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 164-80
(1963).
198. Stevens, supra note 196, at 27.
199. See, e.g., V.0. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 77-93
(1965) (arguing that there are many public policy issues about which few members of
the public hold an opinion). But cf. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY (1957) (offering a behaviorist governmental model built upon rational
political behavior). Admittedly, capacity to reason and rationality may be treated as
distinct from each other. To have the capacity to reason does not directly translate
into the capacity to do it well, much less rationally. Yet, if a majority has the capacity
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in everyone's ability to reason, then majority rule in a com-
monwealth with a broad franchise makes a lot of sense."2°° Without
this ability, majority rule is hardly the best alternative.
Rousseau also addressed this issue. In doing so, he conceded
that the majority may sometimes follow the wrong course:
It follows from what has been said above that the general will
is always well-meaning and always tends toward the public
good; but it does not follow that all decisions made by the
people are equally sound. We always will our own good, but
we do not always see what it is. The people is never cor-
rupted, but it is often misled, and only then does it seem to
will what is bad.20 1
This happens when, in language reminiscent of Madison's, "fac-
tions, lesser associations detrimental to the greater one," influence
the voting scheme so that citizens do not vote in accordance with the
general will but with their specific association.2°2 So long as citizens
vote without the influence of others, it follows that the general will
should emerge from a tally of votes.
Like Locke, Rousseau also failed to provide conclusive jus-
tifications for majoritarianism's privileged position in democratic
circles. Rousseau chose not to confront the issue directly, but to
define away majoritarianism's problems, creating the impression
that he had in fact provided the necessary proof.203 However, like
Locke before him, Rousseau fell short.
There are two important accounts of majority rule I have thus
far ignored. I refer specifically to Professor Robert Dahl and his the-
ory of "minorities rule" and to Professor Elaine Spitz and her Ma-
jority Rule.
Dahl identifies American democracy as one of "minority rule."
That is, instead of worrying about majorities in general and the ways
by which a coalition of fifty percent plus one may form, Dahl states
that "the more relevant question is the extent to which various
minorities in a society will frustrate the ambitions of one another
with the passive acquiescence or indifference of a majority of adults
or voters."2' ° For this reason, he concludes, pluralism entails the
to reason, but does so irrationally, its conclusions would not be considered "right" in
the normative sense. For example, assuming the tenuous possibility that citizens of
Hitler's Germany actually reasoned about the policies they followed, the results
would qualify as the epitome of irrationality.
200. Stevens, supra note 196, at 28.
201. ROUSSEAU, supra note 144, at 26-27.
202. Id. at 27.
203. See supra text accompanying note 173.
204. DAHL, supra note 128, at 133.
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interchange between multiple centers of power.2
Dahl's conception of democratic governance provides a jus-
tification similar to one of the standard justifications for simple
majority rule. This is the notion that an individual might be in the
minority today, tomorrow, and perhaps the next day as well. Over
the long haul, however, chances are that the individual will find
himself or herself in the majority more often than in the minority.2°6
One individual cannot win all disputes, this claim suggests, yet
majority rule ensures that one wins and loses in turn. Fairness
principles would not want it any other way.
However, under Dahl's conception, the fifty-percent-plus-one
barrier does not serve to defuse my critique of majority rule, for the
barrier itself does not cease to be anything but an arbitrary line. In
this regard, analogies to track and field and the "high jump" event
are appropriate. As the bar is placed at differing heights for com-
petitors to attempt to clear, the relevant quest for competitors is not
to clear anypredetermined height, but simply to clear more than all
the others.2 Fifty percent plus one is an arbitrarily predetermined
mark. Nothing about the mark itself tells us why it should be placed
where it is. It simply is.208 And nothing about the nature of the event
itself stipulates that a beginning mark of anything over fifty percent
plus one is unavailing or somehow undemocratic.
Professor Spitz provides a distinct defense of majority rule. As
she envisions it:
Majority rule is a social practice in a sovereign entity among
related, politically equal people with shared as well as diverse
interests and desires. Designed to enable a people to decide
205. ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT
AND CONSENT 24(1967).
206. The notion of permanent majorities challenges this claim. This is one
argument put forth by Professor Guinier in her critique of current American
democratic practices. See Guinier, supra note 78.
207. This analogy might seem to indicate that the fifty-percent-plus-one
requirement, while arbitrary, is in fact valid, for it serves to ensure that one group in
society beats out all other opponents. What if the various minorities were unable to
achieve a simple majority? Obviously, they would have to either deliberate further,
compromise, or see their ideas perish in the vast land of unenacted proposals. Thus, if
compromising, why stop at the fifty percent mark? Why not sixty? Seventy?
Madisonian democracy, after all, feared popular majorities and sought to control their
factious passions. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 Uames Madison). Requiring
anything above fifty percent would serve to mitigate Madison's concerns.
208. Cf. Pennock, supra note 178, at 31 (noting that the "idea that a majority rather
than a minority should govern ... provides major support for the acceptance as right.
. . of a regime adopting that principle. That this is so today derives partly from
tradition").
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upon a mutually acceptable course of action without resort to
force, its characteristic features include the free expression of
ideas, discussion, negotiation, calculations of strategy, and
finally voting for representatives...
Most importantly, she proceeds:
The practice of majority rule... helps sustain the viability of
a community by recognizing its diversity; enabling its
multiple parts to achieve some overall direction; providing a
peaceful, nonarbitrary social decision mechanism; and
encouraging a decent amount of stability. For highly
differentiated people with multiple purposes this method of
maintaining community may be irreplaceable.210
Professor Spitz's characterization does seem to render simple
majority rule as the democratic procedure of choice. After all, any
procedure that depends on practices such as "inclusivity, dis-
cussion, periodic conflict resolution, and joint action '21' does de-
serve to occupy the democratic high ground. With regards to my
analysis, however, it is not clear why simple majorities accomplish
these practices in ways that super majorities would not. Say, for
example, that a fifty-percent-plus-one majority is able to fulfill all of
Professor Spitz's conditions as well as her idealistic practices. It is
hard to see how a sixty percent majority would not accomplish her
goals in a similar manner. Why does rule by the people, to restate
quickly, entail rule by fifty percent plus one over fifty percent minus
one? Nothing in Professor Spitz's argument seems any more per-
suasive than earlier justifications.
This quandary is a real one, and one which the Founders well
understood while developing their constitutional legacy. A cursory
glance at the various constitutional arguments, as reflected in the
text of the Constitution itself, corroborates such an assessment.
B. The Constitutional Compact
A cadre of "lawless"2"2 men gather together as representatives of
209. SPIZ supra note 149, at 211.
210. Id. at 214.
211. Id. at 215.
212. This is the contention of some commentators, based on Article XIII of the pre-
existing Articles of Confederation, which specifically called for confirmations of any
amendments by the legislatures of every state. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 456 n.3 (1989); Bruce Ackerman & Neal
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larger entities. Their mission: to revise some articles of which they
do not think much anyway. They meet in secret, lest word gets out
about this revisionary idea. Rather paternalistically, these fellows
believe they know what really is best for the populace and will let
the people know about their endeavor only when the time is right.
They talk long, work hard, accomplish much. As the story goes,
these characters complete their constitutional blueprint in four
months' time. Legitimately concerned with providing a document
able to withstand the passage of time, these propertied men jux-
tapose as many definite clauses as deemed necessary with enough
vague ones as to provide much needed flexibility.213 As a result, their
Constitution is anything but rigid. Out of necessity, the Framers'
intentions are not always clear.
Where did the Framers really stand on the issue of majority
rule? Did their majoritarian philosophy get explicit recognition in
the final parchment? Were their intentions as majoritarian as their
philosophies might seem to indicate? These are the questions
addressed below. The answers may prove rather surprising.
1. Expounding on the Text
214
A careful reading of the constitutional text provides scant evi-
dence as to the Framers' understandings and intentions regarding
majority rule. This is not terribly surprising, as the very purpose of
the Constitution is "to declare certain values transcendent, beyond
the reach of temporary political majorities. ,211
Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475 (1993). But see THE
FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 4, at 279-80 (James Madison) (arguing that the Articles
of Confederation may be viewed as a treaty among the several states, no longer
binding its members as a result of repeated state violations); Akhil R. Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1043, 1047-54 (1988).
213. Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 3 ("[Congress shall have the power t]o
regulate commerce ... among the several states.") with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 2
(delineating the qualifications for House membership).
214. I take a skeptical view of attempts to extract from past texts any meaning their
authors might have intended. I adhere to Professor White's views, and exercise
caution while examining an "authoritative" historical text, such as the Constitution,
and the various "intractable interpretive difficulties" it presents. G. Edward White,
Reading the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 787, 789 (1994).
215. William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at Georgetown University, The Constitution of
the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 436 (1986). For a
similar view, see also West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
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While musing on the topic of Polish government, Rousseau de-
veloped a useful structure upon which to analyze our own
Constitution. Speaking of the Polish Diet and the power of all its
members to exercise a veto power, he asserted: "The liberum veto, not
a bad thing in and of itself, becomes the most dangerous of abuses
when it exceeds certain limits."216 Unanimous decision making, he
conceded, would be "less unreasonable if it applied only to the
fundamental provisions of [the] constitution; for it to apply
indiscriminately to every decision of the Diet, however, is in-
admissible from every point of view.'21 Therefore, unanimity is not
intrinsically bad, to be avoided at all costs. And sometimes, he
posited, "[iln accordance with the natural right of societies . . .
[unanimity] was required both for the establishment of your body
politic and for the fundamental laws that bear directly upon its very
existence.... ,2"
The concept of majority rule was not completely lost on Rous-
seau. Consistent with his previous exposition on the subject, 219 he
explained that "[tihe majority principle... should apply to matters
of a purely administrative character. '" °2 In between the two, a large
chasm exists, a democratic continuum, and "[d]epending on the im-
portance of the questions being voted on, [different variations] may
be taken as determining the preponderance of the vote., 221 The
importance of the veto and the care with which it ought to be
exercised is reflected in his assertion that "the right [must] be made
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections.
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
216. ROUSSEAU, supra note 148, at 56. The basis of this view "appears to have been
the notion of the absolute equality of each and every Polish gentleman, and this led
directly to the conclusion that the unanimous vote of the Diet was required to approve
proposed legislation." C. Gordon Post, Introduction to CALHOUN, supra note 129, at
xxiiL
217. ROUSSEAU, supra note 148, at 56.
218. Id. at 57.
219. See supra note 148.
220. Id. at 58.
221. Id. In his Social Contract, Rousseau posited similar ideas:
Two general maxims may be used to determine the proportion. The first is that the
more serious and important the decision is, the closer the prevailing opinion should
approach unanimity. The second is that the shorter the time in which the decision
must be made, the more the required majority should be reduced; in matters that
must be decided without delay, a difference of one vote should be enough. The
first of these maxims seems better suited to enacting laws, the second to conducting
public affairs. In any case, it is by a combination of both that the best proportion to
require for a decisive majority can be determined.
ROUSSEAU, supra note 144, at 89.
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dangerous to exercise, by attachin to it grave consequences for the
individual availing himself of it." In this sense, Rousseau accorded
some weight to both democratic polarities. Both unanimity and
majoritarianism can, and must, coexist amicably.
The Constitution contains a number of supermajoritarian re-
quirements. For example, the impeachment clause states that "no
person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of
the Members present. 223 Also, the concurrence of two-thirds of
either House is officially required to officially expel one of its mem-
bers; T and two-thirds majorities in both Houses are needed in order
for Congress to override a Presidential veto.25
These examples show that the Rousseauian rationale is at work
226in the American constitutional structure. For another example,
Article II, Section Two, provides for the President to have "Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .... , 227 John Jay
explains the reasons for subjecting this power to such a stiff pro-
cedural obstacle:
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially
as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not
222. ROUSSEAU, supra note 148, at 59.
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. According to Justice Story:
[Tlhe power of impeachment is not one expected in any government to be in
constant or frequent exercise. It is rather intended for occasional and extraordinary
cases, where a superior power, acting for the whole people, is put into operation to
protect their rights, and to rescue their liberties from violation.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §751
(4th ed. 1873). For an exposition of the various objections to this clause, including the
decision to deposit impeachment power in the Senate instead of in the other branches,
see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 65,66 (Alexander Hamilton).
224. U.S. CONST art. I, § 5, cL 2.
225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cL 3. "[This] power is important as an additional
security against the enactment of rash, inmature, and improper laws." 1 STORY, supra
note 223, § 885. Moreover, Justice Story proceeded:
[The departure from the general rule of the right of a majority to govern ought not
to be allowed but upon the most urgent occassions; and an expression of opinion by
two thirds of both houses in favor of a measure certainly afforded all the just
securities which any wise or prudent people ought to demand in the ordinary
course of legislation.
Id. § 890. For Hamilton's views on the subject, see THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note
4, at 442-47 (Alexander Hamilton).
226. See also 1 STORY, supra note 223, §751 (alluding to the "occasional and
extraordinary" nature of certain cases warranting a supermajoritarian check).
227. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cL 2.
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be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions,
as will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by
men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner
most conducive to the public good.
The importance of the treaty power is also apparent in Hamilton's
perceived necessity to address the clause yet again a few weeks
later. While addressing the many objections raised by critics of the
Constitution, Hamilton explained why neither the President nor the
Senate should have the treaty power without the other's con-
currence:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a
nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a
kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of
the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and
circumstanced as would be a President of the United States.
To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate
alone would have been to relinquish the benefits of the
constitutional agenc of the President in the conduct of
foreign negotiations.,
The treaty power, in short, was deemed an important one and
placed above everyday political processes. Accordingly, simple ma-
joritarianism would not do.
The electoral college provision also follows a similar pattern.
According to its language, simple "electoral college" majorities are
enough for the election of the President.230 At first glance, the Rous-
228. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 4, at 390 (John Jay).
229. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 4, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton).
230. Interestingly, the same stipulation is not found in Article I for the election of
congressional representatives. All we find there is for the people to elect their House
representatives directly, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 1, and for state legislatures to elect
their Senators, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. No reference is made to the method of
election. Moreover, this section also delineates the procedure to be followed in the
event that more than one candidate has a majority or an equal number of votes:
[The House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for
President, and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List
the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the
President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State
having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members
from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a
Choice.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cL 3. But see U.S. CONST. amend. XII (amending the process of
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seauian dichotomy between administrative and substantive decision
making might seem absent here, since presidential elections must
certainly be deemed important, delicate, and in need of careful de-
liberation. When viewed in the context of national politics and elec-
toral colleges, however, the difficulty disappears.
The ultimate purpose of this provision is to expedite the elec-
tion of the President according to the majority's wishes, while en-
suring "that the office of President will seldom fall to the lot of any
man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite
qualifications."23' As a result, the people cannot vote directly on the
election, but must select electoral voters to do so for the state as a
whole. In this way, explained Hamilton:
[T]he immediate election [is] made by men most capable of
analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting
under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a
judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements
which [are] proper to govern their choice. A small number of
persons, selected by their fellow-citizens, from the general
mass, will be most likely to possess the information and
discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation.""
It is clear that this process was a check on majoritarian passions.
Various other mechanisms exist in the constitutional structure
to impede majorities from imposing their collective will. Examples
include the bicameral structure,2  the staggered election for the
Senate, and election of senators by state legislatures.2m The
counterbalancing of congressional power "[lto declare War"23 and
"[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia,
' 236
election).
231. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 4, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton).
232. Id. at. 412. John Jay expressed similar views:
As the select assemblies for choosing the President as well as the State legislatures
who appoint the senators, will in general be composed of the most enlightened and
respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their attention and their votes
will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by
their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for
confidence.
THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 4, at 391 (John Jay); see also 2 STORY, supra note 223,
§§ 1453, 1473 (discussing the various reasons for and objections to the constitutional
method of presidential election).
233. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative power in the Senate and the
House of Representatives).
234. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cL 1. The latter mechanism was amended in 1913 by the
Seventeenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
235. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 11.
236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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for example, with the President's role as "Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy'*' provides further evidence as to the Framers'
structural assurances against majoritarian power.
Conversely, "administrative decisions" can be decided by
simple majority, and sometimes by even less than a majority. For
example, Article I, Section Five requires that a majority of each
house "shall constitute a Quorum to do Business"' ' and allows that
yeas and nays will be entered on the Journal "at the desire of one
fifth of those present.' 23
Arguments in favor of a constitutionally mandated simple
majority requirement are based on two independent claims. One
claim asserts that the Constitution stipulates a number of super-
majoritarian requirements, yet "never places any special obstacles in
the way of the enactment of ordinary legislation signed by the
President."240 Thus, the argument goes, simple majorities are re-
quired whenever the constitutional text does not specifically call for
supermajorities. This claim may be answered persuasively in the
following way: "When the Constitution mandates a legislative
majority, as it does for quorums, or a supermajority, as it does for
treaties, it does so explicitly." 241 It is also curious that such an
important procedural detail would be left out of the final document
if the Framers in fact intended the Constitution to mandate such a
procedure. That such a stipulation would not have hindered rat-
ification, but perhaps would have bolstered it, adds to the curious-
ness of the omission.242
Seemingly, the best textual evidence is found in Article I, Sec-
tion Three, which provides that the Vice President has no vote in the
Senate "unless they be equally divided."'4 If the Framers did not
intend majority rule to be applied as the legislative procedure of
choice, the argument goes, why assert that on a senatorial tie the
Vice President provides the deciding vote? This claim may be
answered in two ways. First, one may argue that "[t]he clause
simply reflects the Framers' reasonable assumption that the houses
237. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
238. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
239. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
240. Comment, An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541
(1995).
241. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 484 (1995).
242. This claim is based on Professor Sutherland's assertion that "[m]ajority rule
had come to be the premise of thought and argument, the datum from which political
theory started." SUTHERLAND, supra note 24, at 199.
243. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cL 4.
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would often choose to use majority rule and that majority rule
would be the default rule applied when no other procedure was
adopted. 24 The fact that majority rule has been a default dem-
ocratic procedure even before the time of the framing supports this
conclusion.245
Secondly, and most importantly, the Framers envisioned a role
for the Senate unlike the one for the House. As Madison explained,
"the nature of the senatorial trust... requir[es] [a] greater extent of
information and stability of character .... ,,46 More specifically, he
proceeded:
It is a misfortune incident to republican government... that
those who administer it may forget their obligations to their
constituents and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In
this point of view a senate, as a second branch of the
legislative assembly distinct from and dividing the power
with a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the
government.247
In this vein, "[tihe Senate was designed to be a select deliberative
body whose special job-unlike that of any other governmental
institution-was to protect the people from policy and value pref-
244. McGinnis & Rappaport supra note 241, at 488.
245. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 24, at 199.
246. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 4, at 376 (James Madison); see also JAMES
MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124-25 (E.H. Scott ed., 2nd ed.
1898) (wishing for "the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters,
distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong
a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible").
247. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 4, at 378 (James Madison). Alexander
Hamilton also offered a similar perceptive. As he stated:
All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the
rich and well born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has
been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been
quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing,
they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct,
permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the
second .... Can a democratic assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the
people, be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent
body can check the imprudence of democracy.
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 299 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(quoting Alexander Hamilton); see id. at 48 (quoting Roger Sherman's view that he
was "opposed [to] the election by the people," insisting that election ought to be by the
state legislatures. The people, he said, "immediately should have as little to do as may
be about the Government. They want information and are constantly liable to be
misled.").
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erences that would be unwise in the long-term." 248 The Senators
themselves, according to Alexander Hamilton, would act as Burkean
representatives, "bound to perform services necessarg to the good of
the whole, though his state should condemn them."'2
4
Thus, to require a majoritarian procedure from a such a dis-
tinguished body hardly serves as conclusive evidence regarding the
Framers' majoritarian stance. In an interesting sense this position
accords with Rousseau's teachings on the subject of majority rule
and general will: representatives vote not their atomistic pre-
dilections, but their perceptions as to what the general will might
be.2"° This rationale helps explain why Article I, Section Three,
contains a clause with such a simple majoritarian flavor, yet a
similar clause is not found in reference to the more plebeian House
of Representatives. It also helps to explain the clause itself on its
own terms and serves to deflate arguments in favor of simple
majority rule as a constitutional imperative. The Framers, in sum,
might have been willing to accord majority rule as the senatorial
procedure because they trusted the institution itself. This does not
mean that the Framers were majoritarians at heart in all situations.
Article IV, Section Four, contains the much debated Guarantee
Clause: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government.. ,.2 On its face, this
clause does nothing more than guarantee republicanism; it does not
specify how representatives in the various states are to conduct their
business.
In this sea of uncertainty,252 it has been speculated that the
248. Vik D. Amar, Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111, 1114
(1988).
249. 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 320 (1861); see also id. at 303 ("It is
therefore absolutely necessary that the Senate should be so formed as to be unbiased
by false conceptions of the real interests or undue attachment to the apparent good of
their several states."). For Burke's views on the general subject of representation, see
EDMUND BURKE, To the Electors of Bristol, in EDMUND BURKE: SELECTIONS 118, 124
(Leslie N. Broughton ed., 1925) ("Your representative owes you, not his industry only,
but his judgment-, and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your
opinion.").
250. See supra text accompanying note 173.
251. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
252. See White, supra note 214, at 806; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 4,
at 240 (James Madison) (providing no satisfactory answer to the question of whether
the "distinctive characters of the republican form" may ever be found); Eule, supra
note 9, at 1541 (asserting that the Clause did not have "a single connotation for those
who drafted the Constitution, let alone for the far greater number who ratified it");
Samuel B. Johnson, The District of Columbia and the Republican Form of Government
Guarantee, 37 HOW. L.J. 333, 358 (1994) ("From its inception, the word 'republican' has
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Guarantee Clause's goals might involve providing "accountability
to the majority with filters to protect minorities,"' 0 perhaps
requiring "that the structure of day-to-day government-the
Constitution-be derived from 'the People' and be legally alterable
by a 'majority' of them." 2 4 Yet, these ideas are nothing but
conjecture.2 In any case, they are arguments about the outer
boundaries of republican government. If we were to concentrate
instead on the concept's core, "[m]ost scholars would agree that a
republican government is, at the very least, one in which the people
control their rulers."'' Beyond this definition, the terrain becomes
uncertain. All we can safely say is that the Guarantee Clause
guaranteed a system of representation to the states at large.
On this issue, reliance on Justice Story's perceptiveness also
proves fruitful. He explained:
The want of a provision of this nature was felt as a capital
defect in the plan of the confederation, as it might, in its con-
sequences, endanger, if not overthrow, the Union. Without a
guaranty, the assistance to be derived from the national gov-
ernment, in repelling domestic dangers which might threaten
the existence of the State constitutions, could not be de-
manded as a right from the national government. Usurpation
might raise its standard, and trample upon the liberties of the
people, while the national government could legally do noth-
ing more than behold the encroachments with indignation
and regretY25
The Guarantee Clause does not stipulate what is entailed by the
meant different things to different people."). But see Akhil R. Amar, The Central
Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the
Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 762-66 (1994) (arguing for a definite
meaning). See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION (1972).
253. Eule, supra note 9, at 1541.
254. Amar, supra note 252, at 749.
255. Professor Eule admits as much, see supra note 9, at 1541, while Professor White
points out the flaws in Professor Amar's argument, see supra note 214, at 791-92.
256. Deborah J. Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role
for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815, 816 (1994); see also Amar, supra note
252, at 749 ("The central pillar of Republican Government, I claim, is popular
sovereignty."); White, supra note 214, at 791 ("Amar's characterization of popular
sovereignty as the linchpin of republican political theory would be regarded as largely
unproblematic by established historical scholarship on the role of republicanism in
early American politics."). In a similar vein, the Supreme Court, in In re Duncan, 139
U.S. 449 (1891), agreed with this view. "[Tihe distinguishing feature" of republican
government, the Court declared, "is the right of the people to choose their own officers
for governmental administration, and pass their own laws. Id. at 461.
257. 2 STORY, supra note 223, § 1814.
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representation it provides or what types of majorities the clause
requires. Interestingly, Professor White concludes that "readings of
the Clause, taken over time, have not been majoritarian, but po-
litical."2 Over the course of the Constitution's history, the Guar-
antee Clause has meant all things to all people. A static majoritarian
meaning is not available.
Article V sheds some light on the Framers' design in some very
interesting ways. The Article addresses how "We the People" may
alter our original compact:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid
to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof .... 2'
Most importantly for our present purposes, Article V allows for
two-thirds of state or national representatives to propose amend-
ments and three-fourths of the state conventions or legislatures to
ratify it. This points yet again to the Framers' distrust of the people
and their factional spirit.
As explained by Federalist No. 43 in language reminiscent of
Rousseau, the amendment process "guards equally against that
extreme facility which would render the Constitution too mutable;
and that extreme difficulty which might perpetuate its discovered
faults. '26° In more explicit terms, and according to Justice Story,
"[tihe great principle to be sought is to make the changes practicable,
but not too easy; to secure due deliberation and caution; and to fol-
low experience, rather than to open a way for experiments suggested
by mere speculation or theory."' Thus, factional interests would be
circumvented, discouraged, and ultimately prevented.
Similarly, Article VII stands as proof of the Framers' commit-
258. White, supra note 214, at 802.
259. U.S. CONST. art. V. For an historical account of Article V, see Kurt T. Lash,
Rejecting Conventional Wisdom: Federalist Ambivalence in the Framing and Implementation
of Article V, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197 (1994). See generally RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN &
JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY
DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? (1993) (examining the ongoing history of Article
V and the amending process to the Constitution).
260. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 4, at 278 (James Madison).
261. 2 STORY, supra note 223, §1827.
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ment to supermajority rule. The article reads in full: "The Ratifi-
cation of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
same." 262 This article is clearly consistent with the Rousseauian
dichotomy. Constitutional ratification, qualifies as a momentous
occasion in need of wide consensus.
Finally, the Bill of Rights,26 if included as part of the
constitutional text,2" undoubtedly affects our understanding of the
Constitution's approach to majority rule. It is in the Constitution's
first ten amendments where one finds the Framers' clearest com-
262. U.S. CONST. art. VII. Article VII is hardly a good example of legitimate
constitutional design. Following Rousseau's advice, unanimity ought to be required
"for the establishment of your body politic." ROUSSEAU, supra note 148, at 57. The
Constitution was meant to replace the Articles of Confederation, then the law of the
land. The Articles, specifically Article 13, did require unanimity by state governments
(not constitutional conventions) for the adoption of any amendment. See Articles of
Confederation, art. XIII, reprinted in ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1048-49 (5th ed. 1970) ("[Nlor shall any alteration at any
time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a
Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of
every State."). Whether the Articles were a compact between the states or a treaty no
longer binding on its members, see supra note 212, is in fact irrelevant. It still remains
that the Constitution replaced the Articles, and that anything short of unanimity does
not seem legitimate. Tacit consent was not enough to give the Constitution its
required legitimacy. In this sense, Article VII can be seen as a way for the Framers to
facilitate passage of a plan they knew to be perilously close to rejection by some of the
state conventions. See 2 STORY, supra note 223, §1851 (requiring unanimity would
have served to derail the Constitution, even though all 13 states ultimately ratified).
But cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 4, at 253 (James Madison) (asserting that the
thinking of the Framers rested on "the transcendent and precious right of the people to
'abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
safety and happiness') (quoting the Declaration of Independence). Traditional
objections to the unanimity principle certainly applied here as well. See id. at 251
(objecting to the "absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness
or corruption of a thirteenth"); THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 4, at 279 (James
Madison) ("To have required the unanimous ratification of the thirteen states would
have subjected the essential interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a
single member.").
A way out of this critique may be found by looking to Article V and its
requirement of seventy-five percent of votes for the adoption of new amendments. By
way of analogy, we may look to the Constitution as an entirely new amendment. By
doing so, and requiring sixty-nine percent of the state conventions to ratify it, we may
then say the Framers were providing themselves the same requirement granted to
future generations. The problem with this line of reasoning, of course, is its
circularity. Also, it completely fails to address Rousseau's position concerning the
"natural right of society." ROUSSEAU, supra note 148, at 57.
263. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X
264. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131, 1201 (1991) (asserting that the Constitution must be read as a single
document, including the Bill of Rights, and not as a "jumble of disconnected clauses").
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mitment to constitutionalism and the idea that certain values must
not be subject to the whims of the majority.26 The Bill of Rights is
"replete with biblical 'thou shalt nots' and enforced by judges who
are politically insulated and authorized to invalidate legislative and
executive action they believe to violate those rights ... 266 Professor
Eule speaks of the Bill of Rights in terms of an "[e]ntrenched-rights
safety net," where a few matters are placed beyond the reach of the
majority. 67 One of the Bill of Rights' "more significant role[s], . . . has
been to protect individuals from the tyranny of the group."26
In the end, my analysis echoes previous works. Robert Bork, for
example, links individual rights to limits on majoritarianism,
asserting that:
the United States was founded as a Madisonian system,
which means that it contains two opposing principles that
must be continually reconciled. The first principle is self-
government, which means that in wide areas of life majorities
are entitled to rule, if they wish, simply because they are
majorities. The second is that there are nonetheless some
things majorities must not do to minorities, some areas of life
in which the individual must be free of majority rule.2
265. See Eule, supra note 9, at 1530 (asserting that the Bill of Rights has served as
"the single most striking countermajoritarian check in the entire constitutional
scheme"). But see Amar, supra note 264 (positing that individual and minority rights
were not the sole motif of the Bill of Rights, nor its most important one).
266. Murphy, Civil Law, supra note 24, at 108.
267. Eule, supra note 9, at 1526, 1529. Professor Eule develops a theory of
constitutional structures and the filtering of majoritarian spirits. These filters are: a
"Representation" filter, which allows for deliberation to occur, thus "offer[ing] time for
reflection, exposure to competing needs, and occasions for transforming preferences,"
id. at 1527; and a "Separation of Powers" filter, encompassed in the constitutional
spirit by federalism and the tripartite system of coequal branches providing checks on
each other's extensions of power, id. at 1528.
268. Eule, supra note 9, at 1530; see also James Winthrop, Amend the Articles of
Confederation or Amend the Constitution? Fourteen Conditions for Accepting the
Constitution, MASS. GAZETTE (Boston), Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION 155, 157 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (stating, upon addressing the
Massachusetts Convention, that "[a] bill of rights .. . serves to secure the minority
against the usurpation and tyranny of the majority").
269. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 139 (1990); see also DAHL, supra note 128, at 36 ("No one has ever advocated, and
no one except its enemies has ever defined democracy to mean that a majority would
or should do anything it felt an impulse to do. Every advocate of democracy.., and
every friendly definition of it, includes the idea of restraint on majorities."); cf.
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 167 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe scheme
of the Constitution is not one of majoritarian democracy, but of federal republics, with
equality of representation a value subordinate to many others.").
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I say nothing new when I assert that majorities may not always
do as they please. If the constitutional text tells us anything, in fact,
it points to the cautious conclusion that the Framers were indeed
fearful of the power of the majority. When it comes to the making of
choices deemed to be part of the "normal" course of business, the
Constitution trusts simple majorities to determine outcomes. For
those times when matters are deemed substantial, on the other hand,
the Constitution requires supermajorities. Finally, for those rights
considered fundamental, the Constitution requires complete ex-
cision from majoritarian politics. Majoritarianism, in this light, is
perhaps a democratic default, to be used when other practices prove
impracticable!"0 The Constitution goes no further.
1
2. The Framers' Documented Intentions
27
Looking to the constitutional text provides a glimpse of what
the Framers were up to. We cannot garner the whole story, howev-
er, simply by turning to the text alone. The Framers' personal letters,
speeches and diaries also divulge, often in much greater detail, what
the founding generation intended in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787. This section tests the notion of simple majority rule against the
extraconstitutional words of some of our prominent Founders and
important interpretations of those words.
The Framers were not blind adherents to the concept of un-
restricted majority rule. As Professor Eule comments, "[i]f the Con-
stitution's Framers were keen on majority rule, they certainly had a
bizarre manner of demonstrating their affection., 273 The Framers'
270. Cf supra note 193.
271. See Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 130 (1996) ("It is simply a reality
that the Constitution was far from a majoritarian document....").
272. As before, see supra note 214, the same caveat applies. Here the caveat is
reinforced by the various difficulties confronting those seeking to decipher any intent
the Framers might have had in mind while framing the Constitution. Commentators
have explained these difficulties ad nauseum. For a taste of the various arguments,
see RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); BORK, supra note 269,
at 143-85; LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988);
Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
1085 (1989); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849 (1989).
273. Eule, supra note 9, at 1522; see also SUTHERLAND, supra note 24, at 198-99 ("The
draftsmen of 1787, some of them suspicious of the unbridled multitudes, rather
yielded to majoritarianism than welcomed it .... "); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1015 (1984) ("The historical
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personal references corroborate this assertion.
In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison delineated the
same basic argument he would later make famous in his Federalist
No.10:
Those who contend for a simple Democracy, or a pure re-
public, actuated by the sense of the majority, and operating
within narrow limits, assume or suppose a case which is
altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning on the idea,
that the people composing the Society, enjoy not only an
equality of political rights; but that they have all precisely the
same interests, and the same feelings in every respect. Were
this in reality the case, their reasoning would be conclusive.
The interest of the majority would be that of the minority
also; the decisions could only turn on mere opinion
concerning the good of the whole, of which the major voice
would be the safest criterion; and within a small sphere, this
voice could be most easily collected, and the public affairs
most accurately managed. We know however that no Society
ever did or can consist of so homogeneous a mass of
Citizens. 4
What assurances, other than good faith, do minorities have that they
will be protected from majoritarian excesses?
Generally, we may conclude that the Framers feared abuses of
power, more so in the context of the new republic they set out to
establish. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 6, spoke of the
inherently dangerous condition found "if these States should be
wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies," as we
may not "forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapa-
cious."27 James Winthrop told the Massachusetts Convention:
The experience of all mankind has proved the prevalence of a
disposition to use power wantonly. It is therefore as
truth is that the Constitution was a fundamentally antipopular act... [and] was not
intended as a democratic charter in the first place ... ").
274. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 1 DEBATE
ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 199-200. Madison's concerns in this regard
are frequently found throughout his writings. In a letter to Jefferson, he writes again:
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is
the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (October 17, 1788), in THE MIND OF
THE FOUNDER SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 206 (Marvin
Meyers ed., 1973).
275. THE FEDERALIST No. 6, supra note 4, at 54 (Alexander Hamilton).
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necessary to defend an individual against the majority in a
republick, as against the king in a monarchy. Our state
constitution has wisely guarded this point. The present
confederation has also done it.276
Unsurprisingly, these fears affected the way in which these men
confronted the constitutional task ahead of them. For example,
democratic principles at the time of the framing did not carry the
same connotations as they do today. "[T]o the members of the
Federal Convention," explains the historian Catherine Bowen, "the
word democracy carried another meaning than it does today.
Democracy signified anarchy; demos was not the people but the
mob."27 It was for this reason that Edmund Randolph complained at
the convention "that the general object was to provide a cure for the
evils under which the United States labored; [and] that, in tracing
these evils to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence
and follies of democracy."27i Elbridge Gerry complained that
democracy is "the worst... of all political evils."2' 9
This concern over the power of the multitude, some historians
have contended, was the central factor behind the elite movement to
draft a new constitution. Charles Beard, for example, argues that
simple direct majority rule "was undoubtedly more odious to most
of the delegates to the Convention than was slavery.' '2W Professor
Douglass adds that most revolutionary leaders "were basically
conservative and felt that majority rule and political equality con-
stituted not only a threat to their dominant political position but a
danger to the very freedoms for which the struggle against Britain
had been undertaken."28
276. Winthrop, supra note 268, at 157.
277. CATHERINE D. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 45 (1966).
278. MADISON, supra note 246, at 81.
279. Id. at 747.
280. Charles A. Beard, Introduction to DOCUMENTS ON THE STATE-WIDE INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM AND RECALL 1, 29 (Charles A. Beard & Bin E. Schultz eds., 1912); see
also CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913) (arguing that economic self-interest and protection of private
property were primary motivations of members of the Convention). On the Beardian
thesis, branding the Convention as economically driven, see VERNON PARRINGTON,
MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1927). For a sample of the many critics of
Beard's thesis, see ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF "AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION"
(1956); FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1958); CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1937).
281. EuSHA P. DOUGLASS, REBELS AND DEMOcRATS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL POLITICAL
RIGHITS AND MAJORrrY RULE DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1955). Furthermore, he
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Professor Amar has persuasively established majority rule as a
starting point in the Framers' quest for a more perfect Union.282 He
deftly pastes together a number of quotes from a variety of
sources-including Justice Story's Commentaries, letters by Jefferson,
the Federalist Papers, pamphlets of the day; records of the Federal
Convention and the state ratifying conventions-to ultimately con-
clude that the Framers were indeed majoritarians at heart. If we are
to follow Professor Amar's method, more sources may certainly be
gathered. In reference to Article Thirteen of the Articles of Con-
federation, for example, James Madison wrote: "Could any thing in
theory, be more perniciously improvident and injudicious, that this
submission of the will of the majority to the most trifling
minority?" 28 "A Citizen of Philadelphia" gave perhaps the most
extreme defense of simple majority rule:
[even if] the majority have adopted a system of despotism...
the minority are still bound to submit to it; for it is the choice
of the majority, and they cannot be free, unless it be adopted.
If it is rejected, then the majority, who are deprived of what
they love and prefer, yield to the minority, which is contrary
writes:
All were agreed that the primary purpose of government was to protect rights and
that the strongest possible barriers should be erected against the arbitrary use of
power, but they did not conclude that the best way to effect these objectives was to
place all power in the hands of the people. Far from it; as men of their age they
feared that unchecked majorities of constituents or representatives would be as
productive of tyranny as an unchecked despot.
Id. Various other historians and commentators concur on this issue as well. See, e.g.,
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 496-97,
512-14 (1969) (holding skeptical view of the people's capacity to govern wisely, and
hoping to temper democratic excesses with the principle of representation);
Monaghan, supra note 271, at 171 ("Understanding the Constitution as a reaction to the
democratic 'excesses' of the post-revolutionary era is now deeply ingrained in
American thinking, at least outside the law schools."); White, supra note 214, at 795
(explaining that "those who pioneered in the creation of a 'Republican Form of
Government' for America tempered their theoretical commitment to sovereignty in
'the People' with a comparable commitment to the idea that the people needed
protection from their own excesses").
282. See Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 482 (1994) ("In the 1780s the special status of
majority rule was extraordinarily well understood."); Amar, supra note 252, at 749
(observing that republican government "require[s] ... that the structure of day-to-day
government-the Constitution-be derived from 'the People' and be legally alterable
by a 'majority' of them"). But see Monaghan, supra note 271, at 139 ("Amar's
exaltation of the prerogatives of 'We the People' cannot be reconciled with the
founding generation's abiding fear of the excesses of democracy.").
283. James Madison's Reply to Patrick Henry (June 6, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 611, 613 (defending the taxing power and explaining
federalism).
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to every principle of democracy.U
There are many more examples.2
These quotations, viewed myopically, indeed seem to point us
in Professor Amar's direction. The Framers, however, simply fol-
lowed established democratic principles, which decreed major-
itarianism as the proper democratic starting point. That "democracy
284. Pelatiah Webster, Reply to the Pennsylvania Minority, PA. GAZZETrE (Phila.),
Jan. 23, 1788, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 566, 568.
Interestingly, this view is reminiscent of Socrates' stance in Plato's Crito. Facing
inninent death, Socrates explains to Crito, by way of a fictitious conversation
between the laws and himself, why he must abide by the laws' decrees. As he states,
.'Then consider, Socrates,' the laws would perhaps say, ... 'But to whoever of you
stays here and sees the way that we reach judgments and otherwise manage the city,
we say that he has already agreed with us in deed to do whatever we bid."' Plato,
Crito, in FOUR TEXTS ON SOCRATES, supra note 157, at 110.
285. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 4, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton)
(asserting that a fundamental maxim of republican government requires that the sense
of the majority should prevail); David Ramsay to the Citizens of South Carolina,
COLUMBIAN HERALD (Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 4, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 147, 147 ("In a state of nature, each man is free and
may do what he pleases; but in society, every individual must sacrifice a part of his
natural rights; the minority must yield to the majority, and the collective interest must
controul [sic] particular interests"); Mercy 0. Warren, Observations on the Constitution,
reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 284, 303 ("It is a
republican principle that the majority should rule"); Webster, supra note 284, at 568
("In a republic, the majority should certainly govern."). Noah Webster, as "A Citizen
of America," developed a similar view:
On the first view of men in society, we should suppose that no man would be
bound by a law to which he had not given his consent. Such would be our first idea
of political obligation. But experience, from time immemorial, has proved it to be
impossible to unite the opinions of all the members of a community, in every case;
and hence the doctrine, that the opinions of a majority must give law to the whole
State; a doctrine as universally received, as any intuitive truth.
Noah Webster, A Citizen of America, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 268, at 129, 130 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 153-54 ("[Iln civil society,
political liberty consists in acting conformably to the sense of a majority of the society.
In a free government, every man binds himself to obey the public voice, or the
opinions of a majority, and the whole society engages to protect each individual.")
(emphasis omitted). As "Giles Hickory," Noah Webster also expressed related views:
It is a dictate of natural law that a majority should govern; and the principle is
universally received and established in all societies, where no other mode has been
arbitrarily fixed. This natural right cannot be alienated in perpetuum; for altho
[sic] a Legislature, or even the body of the people may resign the powers of
government to forty or to four men, when they please, yet they may likewise
resume them at pleasure.
Noah Webster, Giles Hickory III, AM. MAC. (N.Y., Feb. 1788), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 304, 312 (emphasis omitted).
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is often characterized as the rule of the majority, so tight is the nexus
between democratic governance and majority rule,' '2M somewhat
deflates Professor Amar's claim. That the Framers were actually
willing to submit themselves and their "liberty" to the whims of
majorities is a much different claim and one lacking in evidentiary
support.
As Professor Eule counsels, "[a]t a minimum" one must
proceed with "some hesitation when we talk in hushed tones of the
Framers' dedication to 'majority will."' 287 While this is the best one
might be able to discern by looking to the past, turning one's
attention to modern times provides a more compelling story.
3. Judicial Reflections
Early on, voting rights cases were categorized as "political
questions. 28 Under this approach, the Supreme Court refused to
address these issues and instead deferred to the political branches of
government. 28 In the early 1960s, however, the Court sidestepped
all precedential constraints and deftl overcame earlier doctrinal
obstacles. In the case of Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan announced
for a divided Court that "allegations of a denial of equal protection
present a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which
appellants are entitled to a trial and a decision."29' 1 Luther v. Borden,2
286. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 702-03 (1995). Support for this proposition may be
garnered from a number of sources. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 135, at 125
("[Slince the people are a majority, and what is resolved by the majority is
authoritative, this will necessarily be democracy."); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 27 (2d ed. 1986)
("[D]emocracies do live by the idea, central to the process of gaining the consent of the
governed, that the majority has the ultimate power to displace the decision-makers
and to reject any part of their policies."); DAHL, supra note 127, at 34 ("Running
through the whole history of democratic theories is the identification of 'democracy'
with political equality, popular sovereignty, and rule by majorities."); Arend Lijphart,
Majority Rule in Theory and Practice: The Tenacity of a Flawed Paradigm, 43 INT'L SOC.
SCI. J. 483,483 (1991) ("The view equating democracy with majority rule is... strong
and widespread").
287. Eule, supra note 9, at 1524.
288. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.) ("[Dlue regard
for the effective working of our Government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly
political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination.").
289. See, e.g., id. at 556 ("To sustain this action would cut very deep into the very
being of Congress. Courts ought not to enter this political thicket.").
290. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
291. Id. at 237.
292. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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holding that claims under Article IV's Guarantee Clause were
nonjusticiable, no longer stood as a barrier to voting debasement
claims.
In the followingxears, the Court swung its gates wide open. In
Westberry v. Sanders, the Court declared that the concept of "one
person, one vote" governed in congressional redistricting.294 In
Reynolds v. Sims,295 the Court announced that "[l]egislators represent
people, not trees or acres,"296 and held that "the Equal Protection
Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis."297 By 1964,
voting rights had emerged onto the constitutional landscape.
It is important to note that the Court has not determined
conclusively what type of democratic procedure legislatures are
bound constitutionally to follow. On the one hand, the "one person,
one vote"2" standard points to the conclusion that majority rule
must serve as the constitutional definition of democracy.2  As
Justice Harlan explains in his dissent in Whitcomb v. Chavis,1 the
line of cases from Gray v. Sanders9 1 to Hadley v. Junior College
District3 "can be best understood ... as reflections of deep personal
commitments by some members of the Court to the principles of
pure majoritarian democracy. °30
This view is contradicted directly by the Court's decision in
Gordon v. Lance.3 In that case, the Court confronted a provision in
West Virginia's constitution and certain West Virginia statutes re-
quiring approval by sixty percent of the voters in a referendum to
raise taxes beyond the rates already established by the state con-
stitution or to incur bond indebtedness. Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the majority, concluded that "any departure from strict majority
293. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
294. Id. at 7-8.
295. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
296. Id. at 562.
297. Id. at 568.
298. For the development of the standard, see Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
(1963) ("The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote.").
299. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565 ("Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded
on representative government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people
of a State could elect a majority of that State's legislators.").
300. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
301. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
302. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
303. 403 U.S. at 166 (emphasis omitted).
304. 403 U.S. 1 (1971)
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rule gives disproportionate power to the minority."'  But, he
proceeded, "there is nothing in the language of the Constitution, our
history, or our cases that requires that a majority always prevail on
every issue."'  Thus, the Court's most recent pronouncement on this
issue has not accorded majoritarianism the legal status that some
have attributed to it.
An analysis of the Court's internal procedural rules provides
rather important clues about its position on majority rule. Nowhere
in the Constitution does one find instructions as to how the Court
must conduct its business. For example, the Court could institute a
unanimity rule, and decide all cases by a nine-to-zero vote. In fact,
"critics of dissent advocate the primacy of the unit over its members
and argue that the Court is most 'legitimate,' most true to its in-
tended role, when it speaks with a single voice."* Such was the
Court'sipractice for a time during Chief Justice Marshall's early
tenure, as well as during certain moments when the Court has
faced some of its toughest challenges.0 Generally, however, some of
the hardest and most controversial cases are decided by a five-to-
four vote.310
At present, certain internal Court rules operate both as minori-
tarian deliberative valves and majoritarian constraints. For example,
only four Justices' votes are needed to accept a case for adjudication.
While accepting a case ensures nothing, only cases accepted can be
305. Id. at 6.
306. Id.
307. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissent, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 432 (1986);
see also Ruth B. Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 150
(1990) (suggesting that by adopting a unanimity rule, "jurists in the United States
might serve the public better [by heightening) their appreciation of the values so
prized in the civil law tradition: clarity and certainty in judicial pronouncements").
308. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-
1835, at 184 (abr. ed. 1991); Brennan, supra note 307, at 432-33.
309. During the school desegregation cases, where the Court found itself
swimming against a strong southern sociopolitical tide, Chief Justice Warren also
sought and achieved unanimity, because he wanted the Court to speak as one. See
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 694-99 (1977). Chief Justice Burger, in later cases,
tried to follow the same strategy. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979). In this regard, it is important to note
that sometimes the Chief Justice does command a higher level of influence than his
fellow Justices. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 82-89 (1964).
310. Seee.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.
Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); Regents of the Univ. of CaL v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For those who would accord this procedural rule a
dispositive role, compare the previous discussion of simple majority rule for the
Senate, supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text, where the Framers might have
been more willing to trust elite, aristocratic men with a simple majoritarian procedure.
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adjudicated on their merits. If the Court denies certiorari, the liti-
gants do not get a hearing. The Court also employs an unwritten
"'Rule of Three,' which postpones decisions on petitions for
certiorari or jurisdictional statements pending disposition of a case
already given plenary review."311 Both of these rules, in sum, "have a
significant impact on the Court's substantive decisions and on the
behavior of various actors in our legal system."
3 12
Nevertheless, the Court decides its cases on a simple ma-
joritarian basis. I argue that the Court adheres to the majoritarian
paradigm for reasons similar to those found in the political arena:
justifications are lacking, yet practicality rules. However, the
various procedural devices the Court uses to select cases shows us
that simple majoritarianism does not stand alone; minoritarianism
also plays an important role.
Representation and constitutionalism stand at the vortex of our
democratic system of governance. Beyond that, the Court has not
explicitly stipulated that simple majority rule is mandated cons-
titutionally, nor does it have any reason to do so. Chief Justice
Burger's and Justice Harlan's competing assertions314 serve to illus-
trate the schizophrenic way in which we view simple majority rule.
CONCLUSION
The standard democratic conception equates legitimate demo-
cratic outcomes with simple majoritarianism. According to this
view, majorities are "entitled to rule, if they wish, simply because
they are majorities.315 This equation is accurate in a limited sense,
for nobody would dare to propose as democratic a system where mi-
norities rule over majorities.
However, the historical evidence supports a more cautious
view. In this Note, I have put forth part of this evidence and con-
311. See Richard L. Revesz and Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme
Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (1988).
312. Id.
313. See supra note 193 and accompanying text, cf. supra notes 243-50 and
accompanying text (discussing simple majority rule for the Senate).
314. See supra notes 298-306 and accompanying text.
315. BORI, supra note 269, at 139. For competing definitions, see DAHL, supra note
128, at 36 ("[No] one has ever advocated, and no one except its enemies has ever
defined democracy to mean, that a majority would or should do anything it felt an
impulse to do. Every advocate of democracy... and every friendly definition of it,
includes the idea of restraints on majorities."); cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124,
167 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe scheme of the Constitution is not one of
majoritarian democracy, but of federal republics, with equality of representation a
value subordinate to many others.").
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clude from it that democracy need not entail a majority-rule system
of the fifty-percent-plus-one variety to the disregard of all other
systems. Like all other competing definitions, such a particular, ma-
jority-rule definition must be defended.
In the final analysis, I conclude that simple majority rule does
not deserve its privileged democratic status vis-A-vis other com-
peting definitions. This move away from simple majoritarianism
would help clear a path for participatory and representational im-
provements. American democracy and its many citizens deserve
nothing less.
